Fair retirement under risky lifetime
Marc Fleurbaey
(1)
,
Marie-Louise Leroux
(2, 3)
,
Pierre Pestieau
(4, 2, 5, 6)
,
Grégory Ponthière
(5, 6)
1
Woodrow Wilson School and Center for Human Values
2 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
3 CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi
4 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
5 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 PSE - Paris School of Economics
2 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
3 CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi
4 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
5 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 PSE - Paris School of Economics
Marc Fleurbaey
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 741339
- IdHAL : marc-fleurbaey
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5342-8065
- IdRef : 029286719
Grégory Ponthière
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1129355
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7328-4441
- IdRef : 189782714
Résumé
A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies, and (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles as well as raising the retirement age. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Fair retirement under risky lifetime
|
Résumé |
en
A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies, and (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles as well as raising the retirement age. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities.
|
Auteur(s) |
Marc Fleurbaey
1
, Marie-Louise Leroux
2, 3
, Pierre Pestieau
4, 2, 5, 6
, Grégory Ponthière
5, 6
1
Woodrow Wilson School and Center for Human Values
( 251046 )
- 326 Wallace Hall, NJ 08544, Princeton
- États-Unis
2
CORE -
Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
( 48233 )
- 34, Voie du Roman Pays B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
- Belgique
3
CIRPEE -
Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi
( 129434 )
- 3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal (Québec) CANADA H3T 2A7
- Canada
4
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
5
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2016-02
|
Volume |
57
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
177-210
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Mots-clés |
en
fair retirement
|
DOI | 10.1111/iere.12152 |
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