Optimal Apportionment - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Political Economy Année : 2013

Optimal Apportionment

Résumé

This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual's own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules that exhibit degressive proportionality with respect to the population size.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01321784 , version 1 (26-05-2016)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01321784 , version 1

Citer

Yukio Koriyama, Antonin Macé, Rafael Treibich, Jean-François Laslier. Optimal Apportionment. Journal of Political Economy, 2013, 121 (3), pp.584-608. ⟨halshs-01321784⟩

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