Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Pré-publication, Document de travail |
Titre |
en
Observing and shaping the market: the dilemma of central banks
|
Résumé |
en
While the central bank observes the market activity to assess economic fundamentals, it shapes the market outcome through its policy interventions. The more the central bank influences the market, the more it spoils the informational content of economic aggregates. How should the central bank act and communicate when it derives its information from observing the market? This paper analyses the optimal central bank's action and disclosure under endogenous central bank's information for three operational frameworks: pure communication, action and communication, and signaling action. When the central bank takes an action, it would be optimal for the central bank to be fully opaque to prevent its disclosure from deteriorating the information quality of market outcomes. However, in the realistic case where central bank's action is observable, it may be optimal to refrain from implementing any action.
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Auteur(s)
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Romain Baeriswyl
1
, Camille Cornand
2
, Bruno Ziliotto
3, 4
1
Swiss National Bank
( 176795 )
- Banque nationale suisse Börsenstrasse 15 Case postale CH - 8022 Zurich
- Suisse
-
Swiss National Bank ( 344681 )
2
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
-
École normale supérieure de Lyon ( 6818 )
;
-
Université Lumière - Lyon 2 ( 33804 )
;
-
Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 ( 194495 )
;
-
Université de Lyon ( 301088 )
;
-
Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne ( 300284 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR5824 ( 441569 )
3
CEREMADE -
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision
( 60 )
- Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 - Paris Cedex 16
- France
-
Université Paris Dauphine-PSL ( 300302 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7534 / URA749 ( 441569 )
4
Université Paris Dauphine-PSL
( 300302 )
- Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
75775 PARIS Cedex 16
- France
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Date de production/écriture |
2016
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Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
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E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E52 - Monetary Policy
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E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit/E.E5.E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
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Référence interne |
-
Working paper GATE 2016-23, révisé octobre 2017
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Mots-clés |
en
heterogeneous information, public information, endogenous information, overreaction, transparency, coordination., coordination, JEL codes:, D82, E52, E58
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