Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath
Résumé
Real economic commitment (or the lack of it) of others affects a person's preferences to cooperate. But what if the commitment of others cannot be observed ex ante? Herein we examine how a classic non-monetary institution– a solemn oath of honesty –creates economic commitment within the public goods game. Commitment-through-the-oath asks people to hold themselves to a higher standard of integrity. Our results suggest the oath can increase cooperation (by 33%)– but the oath does not change preferences for cooperation. Rather people react quicker and cooperate, taking less time to ponder on the strategic free riding behavior.
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A comme version halshs-03666626 Article Jérôme Hergueux, Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason Shogren. Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2022, 81 (3), pp.591-616. ⟨10.1007/s10640-021-00641-2⟩. ⟨halshs-03666626⟩
