Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2016

Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs

(1) , (2)
1
2

Abstract

When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are effcient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.
Not file

Dates and versions

halshs-01418174 , version 1 (16-12-2016)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : halshs-01418174 , version 1

Cite

Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques. Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs. European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, EARIE, Aug 2016, Lisbonne, Portugal. ⟨halshs-01418174⟩
104 View
0 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More