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Article Dans Une Revue Experimental Economics Année : 2018

Coordination with communication under oath

Résumé

We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01480525 , version 1 (01-03-2017)

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Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F Shogren, Adam Zylbersztejn. Coordination with communication under oath. Experimental Economics, 2018, 21 (3), pp.627-649. ⟨10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x⟩. ⟨halshs-01480525⟩
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