Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
Jean-François Laslier
(1, 2)
,
Karine van Der Straeten
(3, 4)
Jean-François Laslier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 10499
- IdHAL : jean-francois-laslier
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8334-1350
- IdRef : 069975124
Karine van Der Straeten
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 742651
- IdHAL : karine-vanderstraeten
- IdRef : 119884348
Résumé
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting. With a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded, best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner. At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected. The theory is applied to individual data from the 2011 Regional Government election in Zurich.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
|
Résumé |
en
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting. With a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded, best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner. At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected. The theory is applied to individual data from the 2011 Regional Government election in Zurich.
|
Auteur(s) |
Jean-François Laslier
1, 2
, Karine van Der Straeten
3, 4
1
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
IAST -
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
( 506116 )
- 1, esplanade de l'Université
31080 Toulouse Cedex 06
- France
4
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 93477 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2016-10
|
Volume |
47
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
559-587
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
strategic voting
|
DOI | 10.1007/s00355-016-0983-y |
Loading...