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Article Dans Une Revue International Economic Review Année : 2018

Rumors and social networks

Résumé

This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.
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halshs-01631521 , version 1 (26-02-2024)

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Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange, Rachel Kranton. Rumors and social networks. International Economic Review, 2018, 59 (2), ⟨10.1111/iere.12275⟩. ⟨halshs-01631521⟩
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