Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 5102
- IdHAL : mireille-chiroleu-assouline
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8810-4258
- IdRef : 059503629
Jean-Christophe Poudou
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 19927
- IdHAL : jean-christophe-poudou
- ORCID : 0000-0001-9182-1979
- IdRef : 143192027
Sébastien Roussel
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 170522
- IdHAL : sebastien-roussel
- ORCID : 0000-0002-6701-1754
- IdRef : 07730442X
Résumé
To address the issue of potential information asymmetries inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+ (REDD+) scheme, we offer a theoretical analysis of an extended scheme relying on the theory of incentives. We compare two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract and a policy-based contract. Each of them implies a dramatically different information rent/efficiency trade-off due to domestic implementation and transaction costs. If the contract is deforestation-based (resp. policy-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) intended deforestation. We show that a general contract can be offered to recipient countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous, independent of the historical trend, unlike the current REDD+ mechanism. Dividing countries into two groups corresponding to the deforestation-based instrument and the policy-based instrument helps the donor country to obtain efficient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues
|
Résumé |
en
To address the issue of potential information asymmetries inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+ (REDD+) scheme, we offer a theoretical analysis of an extended scheme relying on the theory of incentives. We compare two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract and a policy-based contract. Each of them implies a dramatically different information rent/efficiency trade-off due to domestic implementation and transaction costs. If the contract is deforestation-based (resp. policy-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) intended deforestation. We show that a general contract can be offered to recipient countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous, independent of the historical trend, unlike the current REDD+ mechanism. Dividing countries into two groups corresponding to the deforestation-based instrument and the policy-based instrument helps the donor country to obtain efficient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels.
|
Auteur(s) |
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline
1, 2, 3
, Jean-Christophe Poudou
4
, Sébastien Roussel
5
1
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1171428 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
ECO-PUB -
Economie Publique
( 135760 )
- F-78850 Thiverval-Grignon
- France
4
LAMETA -
Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 2583 )
- Avenue Raymond Dugrand-CS79606, 34960 Montpellier cedex 2
- France
5
CEE-M -
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010
( 532853 )
- 2 Place Viala
INRA - MSA
34060 Montpellier Cedex 2
- France
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Volume |
51
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2018
|
Date de publication électronique |
2017-11-02
|
Page/Identifiant |
1-17
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, Contract, Deforestation, Hidden information, Conditionality, Incentives, Performance
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.10.004 |
ProdINRA | 420575 |
UT key WOS | 000423421100001 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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