Efficiency versus Equality in Bargaining - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article dans une revue Journal of the European Economic Association Année : 2019

Efficiency versus Equality in Bargaining

Résumé

We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-01763003, version 1 (10-04-2018)

Identifiants

Citer

Fabio Galeotti, Maria Montero, Anders Poulsen. Efficiency versus Equality in Bargaining. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2019, 17 (6), pp.1941-1970. ⟨10.1093/jeea/jvy030⟩. ⟨halshs-01763003⟩
59 Consultations
0 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 07/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus