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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2018

Mismatch and Wage Posting

Résumé

This paper provides a wage posting model of the labor market in which workers' search strategies are pure. To that end, the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the announced wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. Under a binding condition however, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01884213 , version 1 (30-09-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01884213 , version 1

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Frédéric Gavrel. Mismatch and Wage Posting. 2018. ⟨halshs-01884213⟩
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