Jury Theorems
Franz Dietrich
(1, 2, 3)
,
Kai Spiekermann
(4)
Franz Dietrich
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 6630
- IdHAL : franz-dietrich
- ORCID : 0000-0001-5300-0109
- IdRef : 125430256
Kai Spiekermann
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 955158
Résumé
We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet's (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters' independence and voters' competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) that the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (non-asymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’.
Format du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Chapitre d'ouvrage |
Sous-Titre |
en
Chapter 38
|
Résumé |
en
We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet's (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters' independence and voters' competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) that the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (non-asymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’.
|
Titre |
en
Jury Theorems
|
Auteur(s) |
Franz Dietrich
1, 2, 3
, Kai Spiekermann
4
1
CNRS -
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
( 441569 )
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
4
LSE -
London School of Economics and Political Science
( 328453 )
- Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
- Royaume-Uni
|
Date de publication |
2019-08
|
Titre de la collection |
Routledge Handbook in Philosophy
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Titre de l'ouvrage |
The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology
|
ISBN |
9781138858510
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Éditeur commercial |
|
Éditeur scientifique |
|
Voir aussi |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.4324/9781315717937-38 |
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