Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2019

Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion

Résumé

Donors usually need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients. A risk is that donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. Using psychological game theory, we design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion toward the recipient is stronger than toward the donor. Testing the predictions of the model in a laboratory experiment, we show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of the guilt. However, structural estimates indicate that the effect of guilt on behaviour is higher when the guilt is directed toward the recipient.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01981632 , version 1 (15-01-2019)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01981632 , version 1

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Giuseppe Attanasi, Claire Rimbaud, Marie Claire Villeval. Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion. 2019. ⟨halshs-01981632⟩
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