Truth-telling under Oath
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
2 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
3 AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
4 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
5 LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
6 Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming
2 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
3 AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
4 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
5 LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
6 Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming
Nicolas Jacquemet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 12676
- IdHAL : nicolas-jacquemet
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5056-9225
- IdRef : 103289860
Stéphane Luchini
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 742445
- IdHAL : stephane-luchini
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2721-0529
- IdRef : 059505621
Julie Rosaz
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 17069
- IdHAL : julie-rosaz
- ORCID : 0000-0003-4653-5310
- IdRef : 15096742X
Jason F. Shogren
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 848865
Résumé
Oath taking for senior executives has been promoted as a means to enhance honesty within and toward organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a “loaded” context in which we remind subjects that “a lie is a lie.” We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment—falsehoods are reduced by 50%. The oath, however, has a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Communication dans un congrès |
Résumé |
en
Oath taking for senior executives has been promoted as a means to enhance honesty within and toward organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a “loaded” context in which we remind subjects that “a lie is a lie.” We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment—falsehoods are reduced by 50%. The oath, however, has a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath.
|
Titre |
en
Truth-telling under Oath
|
Auteur(s) |
Nicolas Jacquemet
1, 2
, Stéphane Luchini
3
, Julie Rosaz
4, 5
, Jason F. Shogren
6
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
3
AMSE -
Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
( 526949 )
- 5-9 Boulevard Bourdet
CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
- France
4
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
5
LAMETA -
Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 2583 )
- Avenue Raymond Dugrand-CS79606, 34960 Montpellier cedex 2
- France
6
Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming
( 152417 )
- États-Unis
|
Date fin congrès |
2018-10-25
|
Ville |
Lyon
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Invité |
Non
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Actes |
Non
|
Date de publication |
2018
|
Titre du congrès |
2ème Workshop « Cognitions, Behaviors and Transformations », EM Lyon
|
Date début congrès |
2018-10-25
|
Pays |
France
|
Commentaire |
Présenté par Julie Rosaz
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Laboratory Experiment, Truth-telling oath, Lies, Deception
|
Loading...