Truth Telling Under Oath
Nicolas Jacquemet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 12676
- IdHAL : nicolas-jacquemet
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5056-9225
- IdRef : 103289860
Stephane Luchini
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 742445
- IdHAL : stephane-luchini
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2721-0529
- IdRef : 059505621
Julie Rosaz
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 17069
- IdHAL : julie-rosaz
- ORCID : 0000-0003-4653-5310
- IdRef : 15096742X
Résumé
Oath-taking for senior executives has been promoted as a mean to enhance honesty within and towards organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth-telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a "loaded" context in which we remind subjects that "a lie is a lie." We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment-falsehoods are reduced by fifty percent. The oath, however, have a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
Oath-taking for senior executives has been promoted as a mean to enhance honesty within and towards organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth-telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a "loaded" context in which we remind subjects that "a lie is a lie." We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment-falsehoods are reduced by fifty percent. The oath, however, have a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath.
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Titre |
en
Truth Telling Under Oath
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Auteur(s) |
Nicolas Jacquemet
1, 2
, Stephane Luchini
3
, Julie Rosaz
4
, Jason F Shogren
5
1
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
AMSE -
Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
( 526949 )
- 5-9 Boulevard Bourdet
CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
- France
4
CEE-M -
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010
( 532853 )
- 2 Place Viala
INRA - MSA
34060 Montpellier Cedex 2
- France
5
Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming
( 152417 )
- États-Unis
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
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Nom de la revue |
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Page/Identifiant |
426-438
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Numéro |
1
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Volume |
65
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Date de publication électronique |
2018-01-16
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
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URL éditeur |
https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2892
|
Commentaire |
This paper is a revised version of Center for Economic Studies Working Paper 2015-68 (Jacquemet et al. 2015) : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01224135
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Date de publication |
2019-01
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Audience |
Internationale
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Voir aussi |
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Domaine(s) |
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
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Financement |
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Projet(s) ANR |
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Mots-clés |
en
Truth-telling oath, Laboratory Experiment, Deception, Lies
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DOI | 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2892 |
UT key WOS | 000459437600023 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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