Do positional preferences cause welfare gains?
Douadia Bougherara
(1)
,
Sandrine Costa-Migeon Costa
(2)
,
Gilles Grolleau
(1, 3)
,
Lisette Ibanez
(1)
Douadia Bougherara
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 737033
- IdHAL : douadia-bougherara
- ORCID : 0000-0001-9976-8543
- IdRef : 077288068
Sandrine Costa-Migeon Costa
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 736074
- IdHAL : sandrine-costa
- ORCID : 0000-0002-8989-8739
- IdRef : 057679789
Gilles Grolleau
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 173592
- IdHAL : gilles-grolleau
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2932-8870
- IdRef : 069697175
Lisette Ibanez
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 736477
- IdHAL : lisette-ibanez
- ORCID : 0000-0001-9235-0574
- IdRef : 083537872
Résumé
We examine conditions for which positional preferences for voluntary contribution to a public good can be welfare enhancing in a one-shot public good game, where individuals may also enjoy a return from their contribution ranking. We show that positional preferences are welfare-increasing only under certain conditions. We find that when agents' positional preferences are homogeneous, they overinvest in the public good compared to equilibrium with no positional preferences, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher public good provision. When agents have heterogeneous positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogeneous.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
We examine conditions for which positional preferences for voluntary contribution to a public good can be welfare enhancing in a one-shot public good game, where individuals may also enjoy a return from their contribution ranking. We show that positional preferences are welfare-increasing only under certain conditions. We find that when agents' positional preferences are homogeneous, they overinvest in the public good compared to equilibrium with no positional preferences, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher public good provision. When agents have heterogeneous positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogeneous.
|
Titre |
en
Do positional preferences cause welfare gains?
|
Auteur(s) |
Douadia Bougherara
1
, Sandrine Costa-Migeon Costa
2
, Gilles Grolleau
1, 3
, Lisette Ibanez
1
1
CEE-M -
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010
( 532853 )
- 2 Place Viala
INRA - MSA
34060 Montpellier Cedex 2
- France
2
UMR MOISA -
Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs
( 28445 )
- 2 Place Pierre Viala 34 060 Montpellier Cedex 1
- France
3
BSB -
Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
( 336963 )
- 29 Rue Sambin-BP50608
21006 Dijon Cedex
FRANCE
- France
|
Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
URL éditeur |
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2019/Volume39/EB-19-V39-I2-P117.pdf
|
Page/Identifiant |
1228-1241
|
Numéro |
2
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Date de publication électronique |
2019-05-15
|
Volume |
39
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2019
|
Voir aussi |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
|
ProdINRA | 471671 |
UT key WOS | 000504882300044 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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