Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Pré-publication, Document de travail |
Titre |
en
Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms
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Résumé |
en
We document quasi-experimental evidence against the common assumption in the matching literature that agents have full information on their own preferences. In Germany’s university admissions, the first stages of the Gale-Shapley algorithm are implemented in real time, allowing for multiple offers per student. We demonstrate that nonexploding early offers are accepted more often than later offers, despite not being more desirable. These results, together with survey evidence and a theoretical model, are consistent with students’ costly discovery of preferences. A novel dynamic multioffer mechanism that batches early offers improves matching efficiency by informing students of offer availability before preference discovery.
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Auteur(s)
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Julien Grenet
1, 2
, Yinghua He
3, 4
, Dorothea Kübler
5, 6
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement ( 577435 )
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne UMR8545 ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement UMR1393 ( 577435 )
3
Rice University [Houston]
( 54086 )
- P.O. Box 1892, Houston, Texas 77251-1892
- États-Unis
4
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 1002422 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
-
Université Toulouse Capitole ( 81148 )
;
-
Université de Toulouse ( 443875 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR5314 ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement UMR1415 ( 577435 )
5
WZB -
Social Science Research Center Berlin
( 216234 )
- Allemagne
-
Social Science Research Center Berlin ( 336883 )
6
TU -
Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin
( 86624 )
- Straße des 17. Juni 135 10623 Berlin
- Allemagne
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Date de production/écriture |
2022-05
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory
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D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D47 - Market Design
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I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I2 - Education and Research Institutions/I.I2.I23 - Higher Education • Research Institutions
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D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
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Référence interne |
-
PSE Working Papers n°2019-24
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Projet(s) ANR |
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Mots-clés |
en
Centralized Matching Market, Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance, Mechanism, University Admissions, Early Offers, Information Acquisition
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