This article analyses the causal factors underlying the formation of French preferences during the Eurozone crisis solving process (2008-2017). Going beyond the clear distinction between national preference formation and interstate bargaining of liberal intergovernmentalism, this article combines new intergovernmentalism, political economy and feedback loops to study the horizontal linkages between different actors included in the process of domestic preference formation. Based on the EMU Choices dataset, which includes semi-structured interviews conducted with French policy-makers involved in the EU negotiations at the highest level, we will concentrate on French preference formation in four negotiations at the EU level: the May 3 2010 agreement on bilateral loans to Greece, the initial capitalization amount of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the negotiations on the legal nature of the "debt-brake" included in the TSCG, and the Reverse Qualified Majority Voting (RQMV) procedure. The article shows that confidential and restricted administrative networks played a central role in reducing the uncertainty stemming from the fragile financial positions of the hypertrophied domestic banking system. At the same time, French negotiators found themselves between a rock and a hard place during negotiations at the EU level, not crossing the red line fixed by Germany, on the one hand, and ensuring that policy solutions were compatible with governmental political stance and domestic economic interests. Contrary to recent research pointing out to the increasing influence of domestic public opinion on national preference formation, however, feedback loops between the outcome of the crisis solving process and French politics and policies had very little impact.