We study multi-period college admission problems where, at each period, a matching is computed and students have the option to either finalize their matches or participate to the next period. Students participating to an additional run of the matching mechanism can submit a new rank order list to the matching clearinghouse. Such gradual matching systems can adequately account for an additional source of heterogeneity among participants, like withdrawals. We identify the conditions under which such systems first ensure that participating to additional runs of the matching mechanism is safe for participants (in the sense that they can secure the spot they obtained at the previous round) and second yield to stable matchings (with a stability concept adapted to this environment). We use our results to evaluate the former French college admission system, where students could finalize their matches at different dates up to two months ahead the end of the admission campaign.
We study multi-period college admission problems where, at each period, a matching is computed and students have the option to either finalize their matches or participate to the next period. Students participating to an additional run of the matching mechanism can submit a new rank order list to the matching clearinghouse. Such gradual matching systems can adequately account for an additional source of heterogeneity among participants, like withdrawals. We identify the conditions under which such systems first ensure that participating to additional runs of the matching mechanism is safe for participants (in the sense that they can secure the spot they obtained at the previous round) and second yield to stable matchings (with a stability concept adapted to this environment). We use our results to evaluate the former French college admission system, where students could finalize their matches at different dates up to two months ahead the end of the admission campaign.
Titre
en
Gradual College Admission
Auteur(s)
Guillaume Haeringer1
, Vincent Iehlé2, 3
1
Baruch College [CUNY]
( 330917 )
- 55 Lexington Ave, New York, NY 10010, États-Unis
- États-Unis
City University of New York [New York] ( 302931 )
2
CREAM -
Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation
( 194446 )
- 3 avenue Pasteur 76186 Rouen Cedex 1
- France
Université de Rouen Normandie EA 4702 ( 300318 )
;
Normandie Université ( 455934 )
;
Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société ( 466141 )
;
Université de Rouen Normandie FED 4137 ( 300318 )
;
Normandie Université ( 455934 )
3
UNIROUEN -
Université de Rouen Normandie
( 300318 )
- 1, rue Thomas Becket 76821 Mont-Saint-Aignan Cedex
- France
Normandie Université ( 455934 )
Langue du document
Anglais
Date de production/écriture
2019-10-24
Nom de la revue
Journal of Economic Theory
(ISSN : 0022-0531, ISSN électronique : 1095-7235)
Publié par Elsevier
Revue non référencée dans Sherpa-Romeo