Land Reform in Vietnam. The analysis of the roles played by different actors and changes within central and provincial institutions
Résumé
One of the peculiarities of the Vietnamese land system is the existence of a ‘zero state’ with
regard to land institutions: all the country’s existing land institutions were put in place in the last
25 to 30 years. However, this does not mean that there is no history of such bodies; indeed, those
that are now emerging carry the traces of each past period. The many local customary institutions
reflect the principles underpinning previous systems regulating the social and spatial distribution
of resources, and elements of the French land tenure system can be seen in the decision to register
land ownership certificates rather than follow the more Anglo Saxon system of using the titles
themselves as proof of ownership. Nevertheless, there is a clear synchronic dimension to the
process of putting land institutions in place, which is reflected in the role it has played in the
profound transformation of the Vietnamese State and society.
In the first stage of this process, between 1979 and 1993, one of the primary concerns in designing
land institutions was to respond to the high expectations of a deeply rural society without making
land an autonomous domain. This period saw the progressive dissolution of the cooperatives
through the withdrawal of their land prerogatives. Moving in incremental stages, the State first
recognised individuals and households as potential land users (with Decree 100, Decree 10 and
the Land Law of 1989), although land use rights were still limited and defined within cooperatives
through temporary contracts between the cooperatives, which still held delegated management
rights, and these new users. This stage ended with the Land Law of 1993 which, while not openly
challenging the cooperatives, paved the way for their disappearance by recognising that
individuals and households had fundamental derived management rights in addition to the right to
use agricultural lands (rights to exchange, assign, rent, bequeath and mortgage land) for relatively
long fixed periods. This gave them significant control over land while dispossessing the
cooperatives of any real land management capacities. Since these rights are associated with use
rights, it was not the land that could be transferred or mortgaged, but the right to use it and enjoy
its produce. However, the very existence of these rights and their fairly long-term allocation to
households meant that a land market could develop, and that land tenure seemed to function on
the basis of private ownership, even if it was not characterised as such.
The second stage was a transition facilitating the ‘smooth’ passage from a land tenure system
designed to meet the needs of the rural population to one that could support the drive to make
Vietnam a modern industrial and urban country. This stage roughly corresponded to the decade
separating the land laws of 1993 and 2003. In this period, the State did little to the rights assigned
to individuals and households and hardly changed agricultural land tenure. It did, however,
endeavour to put in place the land administration, for which it created an independent organ at the
ministerial level in 1994, the General Department of Land Administration (GDLA). For the first
time, this brought together its decision-making, operational and technical dimensions (the former
General department of land management created in 1979, and the former National department of
surveys and cartography), demonstrating the government’s willingness to make this an
autonomous domain that carried some weight. The State also progressively regulated modes of
access to urban, industrial and commercial lands and increased the rights assigned to private
enterprise, thus paving the way for the changes in the next period (albeit rather haphazardly by
generating a growing number of texts).
The third stage started with a reform of the land administration in 2002 and the publication of a
new Land Law in 2003. Land was now becoming a tool to develop the territory for
industrialisation and urbanisation. This was made clear by the law of 2003, which incorporated
regulations from the previous period and barely touched on rural affairs. Little was done to
modify access to agricultural and forest lands, which had been regulated in 1993, or provide more
flexible access for rural households. But the other categories of land and land users – some of
whom appeared in legislation for the first time – occupied a growing and even dominant place in
the law. Thus, the new legislation was full of arrangements to facilitate industrial and commercial
investments by private and foreign enterprises, and allowed for the development of markets for
land and land use rights. It also specified procedures for cataloguing and planning land use. While
land use planning remained a top-down procedure steered by the Land Office at different levels,
the legislation made the planning process much more flexible by extending the provinces’
prerogatives and enabling the infra-provincial administrative authorities to change the status of
lands.
Since 2002, land issues have both multiplied and intensified on several levels. The partial and
poorly managed decentralisation of land management increased the shortcomings and tensions
between the central and provincial levels. On the one hand, the Land Office, which had been
substantially modernised and was responsible for planning at every level, had never had as much
potential power. This certainly rattled the central government and probably prompted its demotion
in 2002 from a ministry to part of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE).
On the other hand, the provinces have used even greater rifts within the administrative system to
lessen the constraints of centralised planning and work very broadly with the legislation in order
to respond to local expectations, and especially those of private interests. The increasing
privatisation of land has been another point of tension. Since the Constitution of 1959, the State
has owned all land in the name of the entire population, and while individual land rights have
constantly been extended, individuals are assigned rights of use and management. However, the
growing number of recognised users, more flexible conditions of access to land and the
progressive extension of rights associated with use rights have allowed private national and
foreign enterprises to become dominant land actors – hence the spectacular growth in the number
and size of landholdings reserved for industrial, commercial, real-estate and leisure projects,
especially in peri-urban areas.
The creation of ‘land fund development organisations’ in 2004 is symptomatic of the problems
posed by redefing the role of the provinces and private investors. Modes of expropriation are a
recurrent problem with investments, and especially compensation for those whose use rights have
been expropriated. This issue was only settled recently, and has been treated on a case-by-case
basis by the provinces or the Land Office. The Law of 2003 still presents the State as the principal
actor in land distribution insofar as it is the authority that requisitions land in order to immediately
reallocate it to investors. However, the State has disengaged from transactions since 2004,
creating a new, State-mandated body to intervene when lands are repossessed: ‘land fund
development organisations’ whose task is to simplify procedures for investors by offering them a
single interface, managing the funds from land recovered by the State in accordance with
decisions by the competent bodies, and preparing these lands for reallocation to investors.
However, the exact status of these organisations, which are not commercial but also not totally
public, is somewhat unclear. They are not financially autonomous, they are not mandatory, and
their form and level of competence fluctuates as they can operate at the district or the provincial
level. This lack of clarity, which results in the creation of bodies whose nature varies from
province to province, suggests that the State is trying to divest itself of the highly sensitive
problem of expropriations at the expense of their beneficiaries, rather than seeking to resolve it in
the long term.
What is the explanation for this disengagement, given that the problems created by the way that
land is expropriated for investment projects are some of the thorniest and most intractable for the
authorities in Hanoi? One reason is probably the increasing complexity of land management, and
the human and financial resources that can be devolved to the administration to carry out the tasks
it habeen assigned. These are very substantial needs, especially at the lowest echelons
(communes, districts) where staff usually have little or no training. But the State’s disengagement
cannot be entirely ascribed to these technical and financial challenges; it is also a manifestation of
the difficulties of addressing two very different priorities: leading Vietnam towards modernity by
transforming it into an industrial and urban country, and organising a fragile and numerically
superior rural population with a long habit of socialist values. One of the factors currently
execerbating the question of expropriation is the fact that agricultural and forested lands have
been kept in a relatively isolated state of suspension for the last 15 years. One would assume that
the State has a duty to protect these lands (and their users), but it is actually making them more
vulnerable to the dynamics of urban and/or non-agricultural land use (industrial and commercial,
leisure, etc.).
Agricultural land has been subject to various changes since 1993, but access to such land is still
highly regulated. Maintaining a ceiling on the amount of land and duration of the rights allocated
limits the process of land accumulation and ensures that the rural population has egalitarian access
to land. By the same token, households that have been allocated rights to agricultural land by the
State do not have to pay tax on this land, whose value is set according to the value of its
agricultural produce rather than the price of adjacent lands (market price). Although this should
mean that such land remains accessible even to poor rural households, this specific status, and
especially that of highly protected rice-producing land, works against rural households by
trapping them in small, low-value farms and weakening their position when private and/or nonagricultural
interests come into play. It seems that rather than being protected, agricultural
households – along with agriculture itself – are being sacrificed to industrialisation and
urbanisation.
However, things are not as simple as the last few lines suggest. On the one hand, rural
households’ situations vary greatly from region to region, and there are cases where they may be
protected by modes of access to agricultural and forested land, especially the most vulnerable
households. Recent events, and the global food crisis in particular, have reminded Vietnam that
there is still a role for agriculture and rural producers, and once again put the question of rural
land under the spotlight. In response to this crisis (and soaring rice prices), the government
decided to freeze more than one million hectares of rice fields and launch a campaign reaffirming
the value of rural areas in relation to urban areas (the ‘three nong’). It is too early to know whether
the return to ‘rural values’ in 2008 will have a lasting impact on agricultural land, and exactly
what this impact will be. But the decisions that have been taken show that agricultural land still
constitutes a lever that the government will not hesitate to use when the need arises. For certain
national officials, agricultural land remains a strong symbol of socialism, and its regulation a
crucial element of social peace in what is still a largely rural society with close attachments to the
land. Agricultural land is also an issue that raises questions about the State’s role in the move
towards ‘market socialism’, and the legitimacy of the Communist Party. While the State’s
indecision (or approximations) with regard to land matters could be interpreted as evidence of a
certain pragmatism and determination to work with the legacy of the socialist period, recent
developments in this domain are testing the very foundations of the Communist Party’s
legitimacy, and it could try to deflect this threat by getting the government to maintain the specific
status of rural land. So is Vietnam heading towards a two-tier system where some land – the vast
block of agricultural and forest lands allocated free of charge – continues to be managed by
central government in the nation’s interest, while other agricultural land can be mobilised at
leisure and managed under a liberal regime in order to support the country’s economic
development?
In order to answer this question we needed to turn to the land actors and seek their opinions. The
majority of foreign actors (who were historically excluded from this sensitive strategic domain
and whose involvement is therefore relatively recent) view the reform as incomplete and thus a
major cause of corruption. They are pushing to divest the law of these ‘socialist archaisms’ and
make it even more liberal. As recently as March 2008 the World Bank, which some see as the
global symbol of liberalism, and which had until then deliberately avoided land matters, signed up
to the highly ambitious Land Administration Project, making it the lead foreign actor in this
domain and giving a strong indication of the direction in which land affairs are heading. However,
the positions expressed by various national land actors are much less clear. On the one hand,
officials in the land administration in particular take a fairly technical approach to land: their main
concern is the effectiveness of the administration and legislation, and making land an autonomous
domain. Officials working directly with foreign experts tend to take a ‘top-down’ approach,
looking at the development of the whole country and seeing the constraints associated with the
processes of urbanisation, industrialisation and increasing openness. On the other hand, some of
the actors we spoke to from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) see land
as something that cannot be detached from local and sectoral contexts. Therefore, they believe
that agricultural land should respond to the needs of agriculture and rural populations, while forest
land should primarily respond to environmental protection objectives. At the moment the first
group of actors is much more influential because of their strategic position within the land
administration and support from international cooperation; however, in the current economic
climate the question of agriculture and rural areas and populations has re-emerged as a priority
and is slowing the pace of liberalisation.
So far there is no indication that agricultural land will be able to take account of the specificities
and great diversity of rural areas, whether or not it is prioritised, planned or liberalised.
Agricultural land tenure is controlled by the State, and characterised more by the numerous
constraints that it imposes (categories, temporal and spatial limits, etc.) than its capacity to adapt
to the problems facing the country’s rural populations, agricultural practices and environment.
Liberalising agricultural land tenure would bring it closer to a system of individual ownership,
which would make land legislation more onerous in many settings where local rights of access to
resources are not managed in this way. The Land Law of 2003 introduced several innovations that
are helpful in this respect, mainly by creating a new category of users, ‘residential communities’,
which allows groups to collectively hold use rights to unlimited amounts of agricultural and forest
land that they are allocated free of charge for unlimited periods. However, this new measure is
itself very restrictive in terms of what constitutes a ‘community’, the procedures it entails and the
framework it imposes on collective management. So what place do customary land tenure systems
have in the emerging land system? Vietnamese land institutions seem to have made little or no
attempt to plan for this; and the main reason why there are still such diverse local situations
appears to be the government’s hesitant approach to agricultural land tenure. The co-existence of
actors with divergent positions on this question and on the role of the State, and the relative
abandonment of the rural world (especially remote rural areas) because it is not considered
important as long it doesn’t challenge the objectives of urbanisation and industrialisation have left
a gap where customary systems can continue to function. The recent resurgence of interest in this
domain could revive the debate about systems that are considered incompatible with the
establishment of a modern State, either because of agricultural practices such as slash-and-burn or
the functioning of longstanding local power systems, but customary systems will continue to
survive as long as efforts to develop intensive, industrial-type agriculture are not sustained
effectively across the country.
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