On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting
1
EM -
EMLyon Business School
2 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
3 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management
4 LISER - Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research
5 UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia
6 BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
2 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
3 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management
4 LISER - Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research
5 UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia
6 BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
Brice Corgnet
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- Fonction : Auteur correspondant
- PersonId : 1259766
- IdHAL : brice-corgnet
- ORCID : 0000-0003-0086-8523
- IdRef : 232850445
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Ludivine Martin
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1026577
Résumé
Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting
|
Résumé |
en
Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production.
|
Auteur(s) |
Brice Corgnet
1, 2
, Ludivine Martin
3, 4
, Peguy Ndodjang
5
, Angela Sutan
6
1
EM -
EMLyon Business School
( 301362 )
- 23 Avenue Guy de Collongue, 69134 Ecully cedex
- France
2
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
3
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
4
LISER -
Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research
( 462841 )
- 11, porte des Sciences 4366 Esch-sur-Alzette
- Luxembourg
5
UPVD -
Université de Perpignan Via Domitia
( 101475 )
- 52 avenue Paul Alduy - 66860 Perpignan Cedex 9
- France
6
BSB -
Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
( 336963 )
- 29 Rue Sambin-BP50608
21006 Dijon Cedex
FRANCE
- France
|
Page/Identifiant |
pp. 23-45
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Volume |
113
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Date de publication |
2019-04
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.006 |
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