Long Information Design
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
4 GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion
5 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
6 TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics
7 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
4 GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion
5 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
6 TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics
7 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
Frédéric Koessler
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 740979
- IdHAL : frederickoessler
- ORCID : 0000-0001-7707-4217
- IdRef : 059897775
Marie Laclau
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 181359
- IdHAL : marie-laclau
- IdRef : 164739068
Jérôme Renault
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 21086
- IdHAL : jerome-renault
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2220-3143
- IdRef : 112479952
Tristan Tomala
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 867581
Résumé
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further information. We consider environments with general constraints on feasible information disclosure policies. Our main results characterize equilibrium payoffs and strategies of this long information design game and compare them with the equilibrium outcomes of games where designers move only at a single predetermined period. When information disclosure policies are unconstrained, we show that at equilibrium in the long game, information is revealed right away in a single period; otherwise, the number of periods in which information is disclosed might be unbounded. As an application, we study a competition in product demonstration and show that more information is revealed if each designer could disclose information at a predetermined period. The format that provides the buyer with most information is the sequential game where the last mover is the ex-ante favorite seller.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Long Information Design
|
Résumé |
en
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further information. We consider environments with general constraints on feasible information disclosure policies. Our main results characterize equilibrium payoffs and strategies of this long information design game and compare them with the equilibrium outcomes of games where designers move only at a single predetermined period. When information disclosure policies are unconstrained, we show that at equilibrium in the long game, information is revealed right away in a single period; otherwise, the number of periods in which information is disclosed might be unbounded. As an application, we study a competition in product demonstration and show that more information is revealed if each designer could disclose information at a predetermined period. The format that provides the buyer with most information is the sequential game where the last mover is the ex-ante favorite seller.
|
Auteur(s) |
Frédéric Koessler
1, 2
, Marie Laclau
3, 4, 5
, Jérôme Renault
6
, Tristan Tomala
7, 3
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
HEC Paris -
Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
( 105633 )
- 1, rue de la Libération - 78351 Jouy en Josas cedex
- France
4
GREGHEC -
Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion
( 1075152 )
- Campus d'HEC Jouy en Josas, Yvelines
- France
5
CNRS -
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
( 441569 )
- France
6
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 1002422 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
7
GREGH -
Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
( 1738 )
- 1, avenue de la Libération 78351 JOUY EN JOSAS CEDEX
- France
|
Date de production/écriture |
2022
|
Date de publication électronique |
2022
|
Page/Identifiant |
883-927
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Numéro |
2
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2022
|
Volume |
17
|
Référence interne |
|
Collaboration/Projet |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Bayesian persuasion, Concavification, Convexification, Information design, Mertens Zamir solution, Product demonstration, Splitting games, Statistical experiments, Stochastic games
|
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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