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Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization

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Abstract

When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized firm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.
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halshs-02613352 , version 1 (20-05-2020)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-02613352 , version 1

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Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques. Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization. 2020. ⟨halshs-02613352⟩
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