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Charismatic Leaders and Nation Building

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Keywords: Leaders, Nation-Building, Propaganda, Identity, Culture



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Charismatic Leaders and Nation Building

Lydia Assouad*

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Abstract

Can leaders shape identity and legitimize new political orders? I address this question by studying the role of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, in spreading a new national identity. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, which exploits time and geographic variation in Kemal's visits to cities, I test whether exposure to a charismatic leader affects citizens' take-up of the new Turkish identity. I find that people living in visited cities are more likely to embrace the common identity, as proxied by the adoption of first names in "Pure Turkish", the new language introduced by the state. I show that Kemal was more efficient in rallying people, compared to Ismet Inonu, his Prime Minister, suggesting that he had an idiosyncratic effect. Results are mostly driven by cities where he met with local elites, rather than with the mass. The effect is not driven by places that had Ottoman nationalistic clubs and therefore that were already holding nationalistic beliefs. Overall, the findings are consistent with the Weberian view that charismatic authority can legitimize new political orders.

Keywords: Leaders, Nation-Building, Propaganda, Identity, Culture

JEL : D83, D74, N45, P48, Z13, Z18

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1 Introduction

"There are two Mustafa Kemal. One is the flesh-and-bone Mustafa Kemal who now stands before you and who will pass away. The other is you, all of you here who will go to the far corners of our land to spread the ideals which must be defended with your lives if necessary. I stand for the Nation's dreams, and my life's work is to make them come true." Mustafa Kemal, 1933

The role of leadership in shaping social and political preferences is one of the oldest and most debated questions across the social sciences. On the one hand, there is a large literature which argues that the evolution of history and norms is mostly shaped by institutions and social deterministic forces (Marx 1852, Durkheim 1894, Spencer 1896). According to these interpretations of history, leaders are the simple product of their environments and their motives, abilities, or behaviors cannot have an important impact. On the one hand, several theories consider that individual leaders are central to influence the trajectory of the society they live in. We can track it back to Thomas Carlyle's "Great Men Theory of History", according to which "*the history of the world is but the biography of great men*" or to Max Weber's more nuanced argument according to which charismatic authority can be key to legitimize new political orders (Carlyle 1841, Weber 1947). There are indeed numerous examples of individuals that are regarded as having successfully imposed new orders and therefore influenced the future of their nations: Alexander the Great, George Washington, Napoleon, Hitler, Stalin, Gandhi, Sukarno, Ho Chi Minh and Mandela. The economics literature takes seriously this hypothesis and the ability of certain individuals to shape identity and coordinate large groups motivate a large theoretical literature.¹ Yet, to my knowledge there is no quantitative test of this hypothesis, and therefore of one or the other view, due to several empirical challenges. On the supply side, leaders may target persuasion efforts towards audiences predisposed to adopt the ideology or identity they want to promote. On the demand side, some groups with a higher willingness to adopt the new identity may meet or interact more with leaders. More generally, the ability of a leader to take action, the market of opportunity she exploits to affect outcomes and the network she develops are typically endogenous and often happen alongside other massive changes, such as wars or crises.

This paper seeks to fill this gap by studying the role of one specific charismatic leader,

¹See Jones and Olken (2005), section II p837-840 for a more detailed discussion on this debate.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, in making citizens adopt a new Turkish national identity. I aim to answer the following questions: Can a charismatic individual shape identity and legitimize new political orders? If so, how and under which conditions?

I investigate these questions in the context of the Turkish Nation-Building era (1923-1946), which constitutes a unique setting. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, a group of Ottoman soldiers secured today's Turkish territory against European armies. This resistance effort was led by Mustafa Kemal, an Ottoman marshal who rose to prominence for his role in the 1915 Battle of Gallipoli, a decisive Ottoman Victory that earned him a lot of prestige and support (Zurcher 2012, 2017). Perceived as the savior of what remained of the Empire, Kemal became a hero of the Independence, which put him at the head of the state. He created the Turkish Republic in 1923 and, until his death in 1938, led radical and authoritarian nation-building reforms in order to create a "modern", "westernized", "secular", and "ethnically homogeneous" nation-state out of a six-century-old multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual Ottoman Empire (Zurcher 2017, Szurek 2016). Besides, he took an active and personal role to buttress the new regime and promote the nation-building program. Kemal intensely travelled the territory and visited more than a fourth of all Turkish cities (Figure 1) in order to rally citizens to his view of the new Turkish nation. His visits happened prior to the age of radio and mass media, in a context where the literacy rate was equal to 10%, which allows me to isolate his own effect from the effect of other vectors of information. This owed him the nickname Atatürk, "*Father Turk*" and, as such, he is often quoted as an archetypical example of a "charismatic leader" (Ibrahim and Wunsch 2012, Heper 1980).

I assemble a novel city-level historical database, with very detailed information on all Kemal's visits. I exploit time and geographic variation in Kemal's visits to cities in a dynamic difference-in-differences design and compare cities visited and cities not visited, to test whether exposure to a charismatic leader causally affects citizens' take-up of the new common identity. I create a unique measure of national identity: the adoption of first names in "*Pure Turkish*", the new language introduced by the state in order to unify its population and territory. To identify a causal effect, I leverage the large amount of

historical information available on the scheduling of his trajectories and on the purpose of his visits. In particular, for each of his trajectory, I observe the stops he made on his way due to the length of the travel. I focus on those stops, which are plausibly quasi-random conditional on road features, and compare visited cities to non-visited cities among a set of cities in between two targeted cities. Those cities have similar observable characteristics.

I find that people living in cities visited by Kemal are more likely to adopt first names in the new language: A visit increases the share of Pure Turkish names given to new borns by 1.75 percentage points, which represents an increase of almost 25% compared to the sample mean. Kemal's visits also induce a decrease in Arabic first names but do not affect religious names.

Next, I look at cities visited by Ismet Inonu, Kemal's second man and Prime Minister. I find that those cities do not adopt the new names as much, suggesting that Kemal had an additional idiosyncratic effect, which might be related to his charisma, prestige, status or authority.

Interestingly, the average effect I find is not driven by places that had nationalistic associations or clubs (the "Turkish Hearths") before the creation of the Republic, suggesting that he did not only make people feel more comfortable with expressing publicly previously known and held beliefs but might have influenced new people to follow his views.

Finally, I use detailed information on the types of activities he conducted during his visits and find that visits where he met with local elites and during which he made a speech were more efficient to spread the new identity compared to visits where he met with the crowd. Co-optation of local elites and political communication are key mechanisms of his effect. Overall, those results are consistent with the Weberian view that charismatic authority can play a role in legitimizing new political orders.

This paper contributes to four main literatures. First, it contributes to a growing literature on nation-building policies. This literature has focused on understanding why

some states decide to nation-build (Alesina et al. 2015; Alesina and Reich 2015) and the effect of nation-building attempts on development (Miguel, 2004). More recently, several papers have estimated the efficiency of specific nation-building tools, such as sport (Depretis-Chauvin et al. 2018), propaganda (Blouin and Mukand 2019), population resettlement programs (Bazzi et al. 2019) and education (Bandiera et al. 2018, Alesina et al. 2019, Bazzi et al. 2020). I focus on leadership, which this literature has not systematically tested with quantitative data, and provide new evidence on the ability of a leader to affect and diffuse a common national identity. I also contribute to this literature by building an original measure of national identity : the adoption of first names in the new language introduced by the state to homogenize the country.

Second, it contributes to a literature on leadership.² This literature is first and foremost theoretical and has emphasized the role of leaders in shaping the outcomes of their society, because they can coordinate groups, persuade followers, organize large movements or spread hatred messages (Hermalin 1998, Glaeser 2005, Caillaud and Tirole, 2007, Bolton et al. 2012, Akerlof and Holden 2016). As a consequence, they are able to shape identity, affect deeply rooted social norms and enable social and cultural changes to happen (Acemoglu and Jackson 2015, Akerlof 2016, Verdier and Zenou, 2018, Carvalho and Sacks 2020). Acemoglu and Jackson (2015) precisely emphasize that, while social norms are usually determined historically, some "prominent agents" whose actions are visible by all future agents, can leverage their greater visibility to change the prevailing social order and counter the power of history. On the empirical side, Jones and Olken (2005) exploit the quasi-random deaths of leaders and show that, at a macro level, leaders matter for growth. There is however fewer micro-evidence on the effect of leadership and on the mechanisms by which a leader matters (Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2020). Dippel and Heblich (2018) analyze the specific role leaders play in helping mobilize and therefore organize large social movements, focusing on the case of the Forty-Eighters in the American Civil War. Bassi and Rasul (2017) show that the pope's visits in Brazil affected fertility beliefs and behaviors. Selb and Munzert (2018) establish that Hitler's rallies had no effect on votes. Becker et al. (forthcoming) show that towns that had strong ties with Luther were more likely to adopt the Reformation in its early stages. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically document the ability of a charismatic leader to influence

²See Ahlquist and Levi (2011) for a general review of contributions from the political science, economics, and management literatures.

and coordinate his citizens to follow his view and accept a new political order. It therefore tests for an effect that has been long postulated in economic theory and has motivated a large theoretical literature.

This paper also adds to the studies on social identity and cultural diffusion. This literature has shown how identity and socio-cultural norms are major determinants of economic behaviors. Such norms tend to be determined over the long run and to be remarkably persistent (Fischer 1989, Fernandez 2007, Giuliano 2007, Fernandez and Fogli 2009, Algan and Cahuc 2010, Voigtlaender and Voth 2012, Nunn 2012, Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013, Gorodnichenko and Roland 2011, 2018).³ We however still know little about how they evolve in the short-run, although we do observe such rapid changes in history (Bursztyn et al. 2017; Giuliano and Nunn 2019). By showing how a leader can quickly impact identity and influence political preferences in her nation, I contribute to the understanding of the drivers and the dynamics of rapid cultural changes.

Finally, this paper contributes to the historiography of Kemalism. There is an abundant literature on Kemalist reforms and the construction of a new Turkish national identity (see Szurek 2016 and Tuna 2018 for a recent literature review). A first and so-called "modernist" historiography argues that there is a strong continuity between Kemalist elites' goal and interventions and real social transformations. This body of works stays close to the official narrative the state produced about itself and about the nation-building era: It argues that the reforms were extremely successful in quickly spreading a new Turkish identity and in imposing new socio-cultural norms to the periphery (Lewis 1961, Berkez 1964). This narrative has nevertheless been criticized by a second historiography over the last two decades, which questions the view of a "*Kemalist streamroller*" and a "*total transformation*" of Turkish citizens by the revolution (Szurek 2016). First, the new republican state did not have the financial means to reach its periphery and in particular the countryside where 80% of the population was living (Tuna 2018). Second, even when the central power was present locally, some places developed ways to negotiate and developed "day-to-day forms of resistance" with the central state (Clayer 2014, Yilmaz 2013, Lamprou 2015, Brockett 2006, 2011, Sakalli 2018). This paper contributes to this literature by showing that Kemal did have an average positive impact, at least in urban areas he visited. Results are mostly driven by his ability to co-opt local elites and therefore are

³See Giuliano and Nunn (2019) for a recent review.

not in contradiction with the fact the some localities backlashed or resisted changes, or that most rural area were not reached by the state.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the historical context. Section 3, presents the data and methodology used. Section 5 presents the results on the effect of his visits. Section 6 analyzes the channels by which Kemal could affect the national identity. Section 7 concludes.

2 Historical Background

2.1 The "Turkish Revolution" and Nation-building Era

"The goal of the revolutionary measures we have already adopted and of those we will adopt is to bring the people of the Turkish nation to a modern and civilized stage." Mustafa Kemal, 1925, quoted in Lewis (1968, p116)

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, resistance led by Mustafa Kemal secured the Turkish territory from European armies and created a new independent nation-state in 1923. Kemal and his associates then implemented a set of radical top-down nation-building policies that affected all realms of society: political, legal, economic, social and cultural (Zurcher 2017, Yilmaz 2013). Their goal was to create a new Turkish nation that was "secular", "modern", "westernized", more inclusive to women and built around the Turkish ethnicity (Zurcher 2017; Szurek 2016). To do so, they abolished the Sultanate and the Caliphate, replaced the Sharia Law by European legal codes and closed religious schools. They also implemented most of the classic homogenizing nation-building policies used in other historical contexts (Weber 1976): They centralized the educational system and imposed a new and unique national curriculum; they built railroads in order to connect the different regions of the new territory; they created a new national language to be sure all citizens would speak the same language. They also passed a series of measures targeting the social and cultural life of Turkish citizens: They adopted the Western calendar and time, passed a law on hat and clothing and imposed the adoption of surnames, following the European patronymic system. This set of reforms has been called the "*Turkish revolution*" as their goal was to radically break from the multi-ethnic,

multi-religious, multi-linguistic and Islamic form of the Ottoman state and follow the European model of nation-state.

2.2 Creating a New National Language: Latinization and Purification

"One of the significant characteristics of the nation is language. One, who regards himself as a member of the Turkish nation, should first of all and in every case, speak Turkish. If, someone, who does not speak Turkish, claims membership to Turkish culture and community, it would not be right to believe in this." Mustafa Kemal, quoted in Cagaptay (2006)

"The [1934] Law will create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment", Rukru Kaya, Minister of Interior, 1934, quoted in Ulker (2008)

One of the central aspect of the Kemalist cultural revolution was the language reform. At the time, the Turkish territory gathered several ethnic and religious groups speaking different dialects, such as Turkish, Arabic or Kurdish. Each of them had their own sub-dialect, which could use different alphabets.⁴ Ottoman Turkish was the administrative and literary language of the Empire. It was primarily a written language, not spoken, known by a small educated elite. When the Republic was created, only 10% of the population was literate in Ottoman (Pamuk 2018).

Kemal and his party wanted to create a new Turkish language easy to learn and write, in order to increase the literacy rate, and that would be common across regions, religions, ethnic groups and classes (Turkoz, 2018). The reform was described by historians as a "*catastrophic success*" (Lewis 1999) and was implemented quite quickly, in two steps. First, the alphabet was latinized in 1928. The goal of this first reform was to make Turkish easier and more distant from Islam, as Arabic was seen as the language of Islam. The second step consisted in the "*purification*" of the Ottoman vocabulary and was implemented in 1934.⁵ The "*purification*" stage consisted in removing words of foreign origins

⁴For example, Turkish speaking Greeks wrote Turkish in Greek characters. Armenians, Assyrians and Jews were talking their own dialect or talking Turkish, but with their own alphabets. Alevi (shia) Kurds were talking the Zaza (Dimili) language. Kemal, who was born in Thessaloniki, was speaking a Balkan Turkish dialect.

⁵For a detailed description of the concrete implementation of the language reform and the institutions and actors which contributed to it, see Emmanuel Szurek's PhD thesis "*Governing with words, a linguistic history of nationalist Turkey*", (2013).

(Arabic, Farsi etc.) and in replacing them with words in "Pure Turkish" ("*Ozturkce*"), either invented or from the oral Turkish tradition and folklore.⁶ This process was partly implemented in a top-down fashion, with scholars and linguists creating lists of words in Ottoman, with their synonyms in Pure Turkish.⁷ Citizens could nevertheless participate voluntarily to the "word collection effort" and send their own synonyms to the central state (Lewis 1999; Szurek 2013, Turkoz 2018).⁸ This process led to the creation and diffusion of booklets and dictionaries listing old ottoman words and their synonyms in the new language created by the state, that I entirely collected and digitized, to create a comprehensive list of "Pure Turkish" words.

What is important to emphasize is that the language reform and the language in itself symbolized the new nation and the entire Kemalist endeavor. As underlined by Mango (1999, p496): "*Pure Turkish became a badge of progressive attitudes and it spread with them*".

2.3 Authoritarianism, Propaganda and the Role of Ataturk

"To see me does not necessarily mean to see my face. To understand my thoughts, my feeling is to have seen me." Quoted in Utkan Kocaturk, *Kultur ve Turizm Bakanligi Yayinlari*, p. 207

To induce people to follow Kemalist views and spread the new national identity, the state used various propaganda tools: First, schools were made compulsory for children, using a new national curriculum created by the party. Kemalist elites created local political clubs, the "Houses of People" in 1931, to replace and strengthen former Ottoman nationalist associations. Those clubs organized meetings, adult classes, theater plays and republican celebrations (Lamprou 2015). Media were censored and from 1938 on, the government nationalized the radio to broadcast state-led cultural propaganda (Ahiska 2010). If the stated objective of Kemalist elites was to create a modern democracy in the long-run, these reforms were implemented in an authoritarian manner (Bozarlsan 2013).

⁶ Arabic and Persian accounted for up to more than 80% of Ottoman's vocabulary.

⁷"*Researchers were asked to travel the length and breadth of the country to record Turkish words which had survived only in provincial usage.*" (Mango 1999, p495).

⁸"*To achieve [the Language Revolution] the first step is to collect Turkish language materials and create a dictionary. Each citizen should carry a brick for this blessed edifice. But the dictionary cannot be achieved without resorting to the memory of the nation.*" (Turkish Language Institute, quoted in Turkorz Naming and Nation-Building, page 43).

From 1923 to 1950, Kemal's party, the "Republican People's Party", was the only party ruling and repressed any political opposition. The single-party regime came to an end in 1950, with the first semi-democratic elections of the country.

The prestige of the hero of the Independence War was also used as an important propaganda instrument to gain support for the reform program (Zurcher 2012). Kemal intensely visited the territory during the first years of the creation of the state - and therefore before most of the reforms were concretely implemented in order to induce people to rally his national ideals. He also toured each time major laws were implemented such as the "hat and clothing laws" in 1925 or the language reform (1934). It should be emphasized that this was quite a large campaign and massive effort, especially at the time, given that traveling was long and costly. Overall, he visited more than a fourth of all Turkish cities, which gave him the additional nicknames of "First Teacher" (*İlk Öğretmen*) or "Name Giver", as he was particularly keen on diffusing the Pure Turkish Language (Mango 1999). Here are two examples of typical visits he made:

Tarsus, March 17th, 1923. The second night he spent in Tarsus, Kemal asked to meet with the hosts of the house he was stayed in with his wife Latife Hanim. Their host were Doctor Ali Refik and his wife Nimet Hanim. Kemal asked whether they have children. Ali Refik brought their two daughters to Kemal and Latife Hanim. Kemal asked the girls their names and when he heard they were named Guzin and Umran, he said '*These are Arabic names, we will no longer use them. Instead we will use Turkish names. Shall the name of Guzin become Gazne, and of Umran Turan*'. Kemal also explained them why it was a necessity to purify the language.

Sivas, September 19th, 1928: During his stay in Sivas, he held a meeting in the city's public square, to speak about the new alphabet and check the progress on the expansion of its use: "*Kemal invited a butcher from the crowd, Abidin, to the blackboard. Abidin came to the front and admitted that he did not know the new alphabet. In ten minutes, Kemal taught him the vowels and showed him how to write his name. As Abidin learnt a new letter, repeated rounds of applause were shaking the square. When Abidin finally was able to write his name, the square erupted in cheers and shouted: "Long live*

Turkey and the great Ataturk !". Figure 2 is a photography of the corresponding scene, where he describes the new latin alphabet to the crowd.

3 Data

My baseline empirical work relates exposure to Kemal during an official visit to the adoption of the national identity, as proxied by the share of new borns with a Pure Turkish name at the city level between 1923-1938. In this section, I describe the data sources newly collected and digitized, including the very rich data on his visits, the sources used to build the name outcome and other city level characteristics.

3.1 Exposure to Kemal during his Domestic Visits (1923-1938)

The main source used to create the treatment variable is a book by Utkan Kocaturk (2009), which compiles information on all Kemal's official visits, from his own private diary and from official archival records. The book contains detailed information on his exact itineraries and on the purpose of his visits. It is therefore possible to distinguish between targeted cities he deliberately planned to visit and between stops on the way to a targeted city, due to the length of the trip.⁹ Besides, for each visited city, we know the total number of visits, the exact date of each visit, their duration, the activities he conducted and the members of the visiting delegation.¹⁰ For each visit, I systematically cross-reference the information from the book with other external sources, such as academic articles, historical newspapers and municipalities' websites. I also classify his visits depending on what he did locally. I distinguish between visits where he met with citizens and visits where he met with local elites (or both). I consider he visited local elites if he had a meeting, lunch or dinner with local economic, administrative or political personalities, or went with them in official institutions such as the municipality building, the state house ("*Hukumet Binasi*") or military bases. If he went to public places - such as public

⁹As an anecdotal example of the length of trips at the time, we can read in Mango (1999, p233): "*The distance between Sivas and Erzurum is about 350 miles. But roads were little better than rough tracks and it took Mustafa Kemal, Rauf and his party a week to reach their destination.*"

¹⁰For example, I observe whether he was accompanied by a woman - his wife Latife, his sister Makbule, or his adoptive daughters Afet Inan or Sabiha Gokcen. This information will be useful in future analysis looking at short and long-run development outcomes by gender, as part of the new Turkish identity was to promote equality between men and women.

squares, train stations, port, horse race stadiums etc.- I consider he met with the crowd.¹¹ I also know when he pronounced a speech.¹² I finally coded whether he conducted an activity related to the nation-building reforms, such as visiting a school or opening a new train station.

Figure 3 shows the timeline of the visits. He visited in total more than a hundred and twenty cities, that is more than a quarter of all Turkish cities at the time. The average length of the first visit was one day and a half. Interestingly, he conducted most visits in the first two years after the creation of the Republic, before the implementation of most of the reforms. In 1925, more than 50% of visited cities were already visited. This might suggest that a leader could be a particularly efficient nation-building tools at the beginning of such efforts, when state capacity is still low. Other, more classic, nation-building efforts such as education or transportation investments, typically require time, large infrastructure investments and substantial state capacity. On the contrary, a leader is mobile, cheaper and can be used relatively quickly to convey information and influence others to follow. Kemal nevertheless toured again quite intensely in 1934, the year of the implementation of the language reform.

3.2 First Names as Proxy for Identity and Political Preferences

Historical survey measures of cultural values or public opinions do not exist. A good alternative, however, is to look at naming choices. As emphasized by a large psychological and sociological literature, first names constitute unique "*windows into socio-cultural worlds*" and signal attachment to a number of groups, such age, gender, ethnicity or religion (Coulmont 2011, Mateos 2013). They also provide a strong marker of an individual identification and integration to her in-group and/or her national community (Beck Knudsen 2019). Finally, names are visible, quite stable over time and often systematically

¹¹For example, the Sivas example will be coded as "meeting with the mass" and the Tarsus example as "meeting with local elites or personalities".

¹²I coded whether his speeches are made in public (in front of the national clubs (*Türk Ocakları* or *Halk Evleri*) on the public square) or in private, during a dinner. I also collected, dated and localized the entire corpus of speeches he made during his visits. In future analyzes, I plan to descriptively analyze this textual database and also to study the differential effect of his rhetoric.

collected by the state, which facilitates quantitative analysis.¹³

Pure Turkish Names as a Marker of Adherence to Kemalism

In order to measure adherence to the Kemalist reform program and to the new modern and secular national identity, I look at the variation in the share of new borns with first names in "Pure Turkish", the new language introduced by the state, in cities visited and not visited. To do so, I use two datasources. First, I use the 2009 exhaustive individual census micro-data from the Ministry of Interior, which reports the first and last names, the date and place of birth of all Turkish individuals older than 18 years old in 2009. Second, I collected and digitized all historical booklets, dictionaries and newspapers published in the 1930s to spread the new language, and created a new and comprehensive list of more than 13,000 words in "*Pure Turkish*".¹⁴ Figure 4 shows an example of a historical booklet listing new words and of a newspaper, publishing a dictionary with words in Ottoman and their synonyms in the new language.

I finally take advantage of the fact that in Turkish, first names are words, to classify first names in the census data using this list of new words.¹⁵ This enables me to create a panel of the share of new borns' first names in Pure Turkish by city, between 1915 to 1990. It should be emphasized that this is a unique measure of national identity over time and space. Indeed, as described in Section 2.2, the "Pure Turkish" language was clearly associated with the new socio-cultural identity propagated by Kemalist elites, and which has its own mix of nationalism and secularism.

¹³As a consequence, names have been used in a growing number of studies in economics (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2018, Fouka 2020, for some examples.)

¹⁴I digitized the following sources, referenced by Turkoz (2017, p115): Osmanlicadan Turkce ye Cep Kilavuzu [Ottoman-Turkish Pocket Guide] (Istanbul: Devlet Basim Evi, 1935); Orbay, K.S. 1935. Oz Turkce Adlar ve Sozler: Yeni soy adlari [Names and Words in Ozturkce: The New Surnames]. Istanbul: Hilmi Kitap Evi. Behnan, (Sapolyo) Enver. 1935. Turk Soyadi: 3396 Turk adi [The Turkish Surname: 3396 Turkish Names] Maarif Kitap evi sahibi Tarik. Ankara: Koyhocasi Matbaasi; D.K.O. 1935. Ozturkce Secme Soy Adlari: Karsiliklari ve Manalari. Tefeyyuz Kitaphanesi; Karauguz, Akin Tahir. 1935. Oz Turk Adlari Kilavuzu. Zonguldak: Karaelmas Basimevi ; Besim Atalay, 1935 Turk Buyukleri veya Turk Adlari [Turkish Heroes and Turkish Names; Karauguz, Akin Tahir. 1935. Oz Turk Adlari Kilavuzu. Zonguldak: Karaelmas Basimevi. Riza Nour, "Noms propres turcs," Revue de Turcologie 5 (February 1935): 65-72; 65 (circulaire du Ministere de l'Education).Vural, M. 1935. Oz Turkce Kadin ve Erkek Adlari ve Soy Adlari: Oz Turkce Dil Degisimine Armagan [Women's and Men's Proper Names and Surnames in Oz Turkce : A Gift to the Oz Turkce Language Turn] (3. Basilisi) Bursa Bizim Matbaa.; Ulus Newspapers March-May 1935.

¹⁵Examples of "Pure Turkish" names are: Ipek (silk), Isik (light), Kaya (rock), Orhan (body, organ), Pamuk (cotton), Savas (war).

Two caveat should nevertheless be point out. First, the 2009 census data on contain individuals still alive in 2009. One could worry that there is a differential survival rate between people having a Pure Turkish first name and others.¹⁶ Second, if names in the new language convey Kemalist values, one can wonder whether giving a Pure Turkish name is a true sign of adherence to the reform program and to the new identity or rather a sign of opportunism or fear. At a minimum, the measure is a good proxy for the state's penetration and control over the periphery. Nevertheless, if individuals were fearing repression, they could adopt Pure Turkish last names - and indeed most of the population did (Turkoz 2017).¹⁷ Also, as historians note, Kemalist elites and the young Turkish state did not have the means to implement a heavy and totalitarian repression of their citizens - and therefore to systematically control and repress people not giving first names in Pure Turkish (Pamuk 2018; Aymes et al. 2013).

Figure 5 shows the evolution of the share of names in "Pure Turkish", for visited cities and non visited cities between 1915 and 1990. The peak in the share of Pure Turkish first names in 1934, which coincides with a peak in his visits and the 1934 language reform, is striking and suggests that the reform was quite successful and relatively well-received. Visited cities, however, react more strongly to the reform.

Religious and Arabic First Names

I construct a similar measure for Muslim first names. Those religious first names could not only proxy for an individual attachment to Islam, but also for an attachment to the former Ottoman Empire and/or to tradition. To identify religious first names, I use an approach developed by Sakalli (2018). I classify four types of male first names: (1) The variations of the name of the Islamic prophet in its Arabic form "Muhammad" (Muhamed, Muhamet, Muhammed , Muhammet)¹⁸; (2) First names in the form of "... of

¹⁶To check for a potential survival bias, I just collected a new dataset on the entire universe of the Turkish birth certificates between 1920 and 1950, at today-district of birth level, and plan to replicate the analysis with this datasource.

¹⁷In my data, more than 80% of last names are in Pure Turkish, versus less than 20% for the first names

¹⁸The Turkish version of Muhammed, "Mehmet", is not classified as religious.

religion", i.e., names ending with "-(i)ddin" and "-(i)ttin"); (3) First names in the form of "... of Allah (God in Islam)", i.e., names ending with "-(u)llah"; (4) First names in the form of "servant of ...", i.e., names beginning with "Abd-" and ending with an attribute of Allah. Example of typical religious names are : Abdulhalim, Abdurahman, Emrullah, Muhammet, Abdullah, Muhittin or Feyzullah.

I also created a list of Arabic first names. Example of Arabic names are: Abbas, Bekir, Beyhan, Celal, Cemile, Elif, Fatma, Hamide, Malik or Necmettin.

3.3 Additional variables - historical and geographic controls

I finally collect additional data from various archival sources at the city level: population, administrative statuses (province or district centers, municipality, locality), the presence of a railway line, of an Ottoman nationalistic clubs (the "*Turkish Hearths or Rooms*", that I use as a proxy of pre-treatment adherence to the nationalist ideology).¹⁹ I also collect geographic information: elevation, coastal cities, distance to the capital, distance to battlefields from the 1919-1922 Independence War, distance to minority villages from Nisanyan (2010) and digitized by Sakalli (2018).

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Predicting Kemal's Appearances

In a first step, I run an OLS regression on the probability of a visit as a function of pre-treatment (that is pre-1923) historical and geographic covariates collected. The estimation results, displayed in Table 1, are interesting in their own right and enable us to understand how Kemal planned his visits. It appears that the administrative status of a city - which is highly correlated with its population size- is a consistent predictor of Kemal's visits. His visits appear to be complement to local characteristics as he visited

¹⁹Information on population comes from the 1927, 1935 official population Censuses, from the Turkish Statistical Institutes (TUIK). Data on the Turkish rooms come from the book by Fusun Ustel, *Türk Ocakları 1912-1931*

cities that had nationalistic clubs before 1923 and therefore more likely to be nationalist and conducive to his cultural program. He finally went more to places easier to access, close to a railway, on the coast and less elevated. I systematically include the main predictors of his visits as controls in my main baseline empirical specification.

4.2 A Quasi-Random Set of Cities: Sample Selection

Unsurprisingly, Kemal carefully targeted his visits: Visited cities are different from non-visited cities, as shown in Table 2 which presents the summary statistics of the main city database. The full sample contains 504 cities, out of which 128 were visited. Kemal mostly visited the most populated and developed cities, the province centers, along the railway or on the coast and which had a nationalistic club already during the Ottoman era.²⁰

In order to identify quasi exogenous variation in his visits, I leverage the large amount of information existing on the purpose and the planning of his visits. First, cities at the start and end points of a given trajectory do not provide exogenous variation. Kemal selected these cities either because they were strategic for his purposes, easier to access or both. My empirical strategy cannot identify the causal effect of exposure to Kemal for these cities and therefore I remove them from my main sample.²¹ Second, I restrict the sample to cities that are on his itinerary.²² Concretely, this procedure excludes non-visited cities that are far from the railway and isolated and therefore quite different from cities on his itinerary. I finally remove remaining cities that are highly populated - mainly visited cities.²³ This procedure enables me to obtain a comparable group of visited cities and non-visited cities. Table 3 presents the difference of means between non-visited and visited cities in the restricted sample. The two groups appear to be very similar and balanced over the set of historical and geographic covariates. Most importantly, cities in

²⁰The highest administrative divisions are the provinces, then the districts.

²¹This procedure is standard in the literature on least cost paths (Faber 2014)

²²Using a GIS software, I compute the least cost path between two termini city - a destination point and an end point - taking into account the railway network and topography features, for each year. Using the railway is the less costly procedure. Crossing a mountain is very costly. I restrict my sample to cities within a 20 km buffer of all his paths. Results are robust to other cutoffs choice.

²³I remove cities larger than 12,000 inhabitants, which define the top 10% of the population distribution (mean of 5,700 and median of 3,500), and are primarily visited cities so with no common support. Including or not these cities do not affect the results, but only modify the balance of the sample, with a 5% significant difference in population size between treated and control group, but no difference in any other dimension.

between two targeted cities constitute plausible quasi-random stops, conditional on the termini cities and road features in between.

4.3 Difference-in-Differences at the city level

To test for the causal impact of the appearance of a charismatic leader on the adoption of the national identity, I use a general difference-in-differences design and estimate the following specification for all cities in the restricted sample over the 1918-1950 period:

$$Y_{c,t} = \alpha_c + \gamma_t + \beta(Treated_c * Post_t) + \theta X_c * \gamma_t + \epsilon_{c,t} \quad (1)$$

where c stands for city and t for the year. $Y_{c,t}$ is the share of name in Pure Turkish (or Religious names) for city c in year t ; $Treated_c * Post_t$ is a dummy equal to one if city c is visited for the first time in year t and which stays equal to one the following years. I also include a vector of pre-treatment time in-varying historical and geographic controls, X_c , interacted with a year dummy. By doing so, I allow each control to have a differential effect each year, which is a rather conservative assumption. I also include city fixed effects α_c and year fixed effects γ_t in all regressions, which allows me to control for any time-invariant differences between cities and for year-specific shocks common to all cities. I cluster all errors at the city level, as it is the level of treatment. The coefficient on $Treated_c * Post_t$ is the coefficient of interest and captures the additional change in the share of Pure Turkish names in treated cities, relative to untreated cities, following a visit.

4.4 Event-Study Specification

The main identification assumption underlying this strategy is that, in the absence of a visit, the average change in the share of name in Pure Turkish in treated and control cities would have been the same - the two types of cities would have continued to experience parallel trends. To check for this assumption, I look at the pre-trends by estimating the following event-study specification :

$$Y_{c,t} = \alpha_c + \gamma_t + \sum_{j=-N_0}^{N_1} \beta_j \mathbb{1}[J_{c,t} = j] + \theta X_c * \gamma_t + \epsilon_{c,t}$$

where $[-N_0; N_1]$ is the window of dynamic effects around the event, $J_{c,t} = t - E_{c,t}$ denotes event time, that is the time in year relative to the occurrence of the event. The $\{\beta_j\}_{j=-N_0}^{N_1}$ coefficients give the full path of dynamic effects, that is pre-event effects necessary to check for pre-trends, but also post-event effects. The estimate represents the difference in share of names between the treated and control observations, before and after the visits. The omitted time period is one year prior to the visit and all coefficients should be interpreted with regards to this year.

5 Effects of Kemal's visits

5.1 Baseline Results

Table 4 presents the main results on the effect of the visits on first names in "Pure Turkish". Cities visited are more likely to adopt first names in the new language, which proxies for adherence to the new identity. Column (11) presents the benchmark specification, including as control variables the main predictors of his visits. I find that a visit increases the share of Turkish names by 1.75 percentage point, which represents an increase of 23% compared to the sample mean. Column (12) shows a specification that include all covariates as controls. In all specifications, the effect is positive, large and significant. Importantly, the coefficient is quite stable across specifications.

Figure 6 plots the coefficient estimates of the event study, $\{\beta_j\}_{j=-N_0}^{N_1}$. Prior to the first visit, the estimated difference between the treatment and control cities is indistinguishable from zero, which allows me to estimate the causal effect of being exposed to Kemal. Following the visits, the share in first names in "Pure Turkish" in visited cities increases significantly relative to the share in control cities. The effect is persistent and still significant. We also observe a strong and significant rise after 10 years: As most visited cities were visited in 1923-1924, this corresponds to the years close to the 1934 Language reform.

5.2 Effect on Arabic and Religious Names

Next, I look at the effect of Kemal's visits on Arabic and religious first names. As shown in Figure 7, Kemal's visits seem to have decreased the share of Arabic first names, with again a quite lasting effect. Figure 8 shows that Kemal's visits had however no effect on Islamic first names. I find this null effect in all specifications. If Kemal managed to transmit a new identity, associated with secular value, he did not seem to have deeply secularized people, or at least impacted the choice of Muslim first names. This is not surprising, however, and illustrates an important feature of the Turkish secularization and nation-building processes. The new identity had to be "purely Turkish" and as most Turks were Muslims, emphasizing the Turkish identity amounted to emphasize a Muslim identity. In other words, being Muslim was an implicit condition to belong to the new secular Turkish nation, at the expense of other religious and ethnic identities (Cagaptay 2006, Fabbe 2019). Those results should nevertheless be interpreted with caution as my list of religious first names do not include some Arabic or Persian names, which could also signal an attachment to Islam.

6 Mechanisms

6.1 Charisma, Prestige and Authority: Kemal versus Inonu

Ismet Inonu was Kemal's Prime Minister and "second man". Former revolutionary, he was one of Kemal's most important adviser and a key political figure during the nation-building era. He became President after Kemal's death. Inonu intensely visited Turkey between 1923 and 1938, with Kemal and alone. The visits of both politicians had the same purpose: convey Kemalist ideas to the periphery of the Turkish territory and convince citizens of the merits of the nation-building reform program. Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggest that Inonu was less charismatic than Kemal (Heper 1998).²⁴

²⁴In his book on Inonu's career and life, Heper emphasizes Inonu's large influence on Turkish politics and challenges the most commonly held view according to which Inonu was Kemal's "second fiddle". He nevertheless "acknowledges" the primacy of Kemal during his lifetime, in particular in terms of charisma: "*During the years Ataturk was alive, Ataturk's authority, which derived from his charisma, was indispensable for the future of the regime in Inonu's eyes. It has been argued that Ataturk knew of Inonu's thinking on this matter and thus picked Inonu as his prime minister in 1923.*" for example (Heper 1998, p112).

I collected similar data on Ismet Inonu's visits over the same period, to replicate my baseline analysis and compare the impact of both men.²⁵ In total, on the 504 main cities included in my sample, 135 cities were visited: 74 by Kemal only, 26 by Inonu only and 54 by both. This allows me to test whether Kemal had an idiosyncratic effect, and therefore whether the effect channels through charisma, authority or prestige. If Kemal had an informational role only, or a role similar to Inonu's, one would expect that both Kemal and Inonu have the same influence on naming pattern in visited cities.

Table 5 presents the results of a similar difference-in-differences specification. Columns (1) to (4) use the main restricted sample and Column (1) shows the benchmark effect of Kemal's visits. Column (5) to (8) use the full sample. Coefficients are systematically larger and more significant for Kemal's visits, even if Inonu had an effect as well. This suggests that Kemal had an additional effect - potentially due to his prestige, status or charisma.

6.2 Political persuasion

Are the results driven by cities who were already nationalist but did not dare to express their opinion during the Ottoman Era? Or did Kemal manage to induce and coordinate others to follow his views? To answer this question, I compare places that had nationalistic clubs - and therefore that were more nationalist- to other cities. Table 6 presents the results of this heterogeneity exercise. Column (1) shows the benchmark effect. Column (2) shows the coefficient from the main treatment variable interacted with a dummy for the presence of a nationalistic club before 1923. Column (3) show the coefficients of both the main treatment and the interacted treatment. It appears that, although he targeted places with such clubs and nationalistic infrastructures, the effect is not stronger in those cities. This suggests that the effect is not only driven by people who were already holding nationalist beliefs and who became more comfortable with expressing them after a visit

²⁵I have information on the cities he visited and at which exact date. There are nevertheless less detailed information on the content of Inonu's visits as well as on how they were scheduled, compared to Kemal. For instance, I do not know which visits were targeted and which ones were simple stops on the road in Inonu's case. Data primarily come from the following website: <http://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/> and online archives of "Cumhuriyet" and "Ulus" newspapers, on the dates of Inonu's visits. I also cross check the information using Ahmet Demirel's book "Defterler, 1919-1973" (2001) which compiles Inonu's personal notes.

during which the President defended those beliefs. Finally, these results are interesting to understand the role of social capital in the rise of new political orders. Contrarily to the nazi case studied by Satyanath et al. (2017), cities with more associations and political clubs were not more likely to embrace Kemalism in Turkey.

6.3 Which activities are the most efficient ?

To understand better how exactly his visits affected naming choices, I use variation in the type of activities he conducted. More precisely, for each visit, I coded whether he met with the elite or the mass (or both) and/or whether he made a speech. Table 7 displays the results. It appears that the average effect is mostly driven by cities where he made speeches and where he met and interacted with the city elites, suggesting that a key mechanism behind the effect of his visits is the persuasion and cooptation of local elites, to serve as his bureaucratic and electoral power base. Communicating - either publicly or privately- also seems to be a particularly efficient propaganda tool, adding some evidence on the role of his charisma.

7 Conclusion

Can a charismatic leader shape identity and legitimize a new political order? In this paper, I answer this question by studying the role of Mustafa Kemal in spreading the new Turkish national identity during the first years of the creation of Turkey (1923-1938). I create a new historical city-level database, with detailed information on his visits as well as other historical and geographic characteristics. I build a new and unique measure of national identity: the share of first names in Pure Turkish, the new language introduced by the state to homogenize its population and its territory.

I show that cities visited are more likely to embrace the common identity, using a generalized difference-in-differences design that exploits time and geographic variation in Kemal's visits to cities and information on the planning of his visits. I compare the effect of Kemal's visits to the ones of Ismet Inonu, Kemal's second man. I show that Kemal was more effective, suggesting that he had an idiosyncratic effect, which could be due to his prestige, authority or charisma. Using detailed information on the types of activities

he held, I find that the effect is mostly driven by cities where he met with local elites, as opposed to visits where he met with the crowd. Cooptation of local elites during the visits is therefore a key mechanism behind the spread of the new identity. Results are not driven by cities that already had nationalist clubs, which suggest that he did not only make people feel more comfortable with expressing previously held nationalist views, but also made some citizens follow his views.

Overall, those results are consistent with the Weberian view that charismatic authority can play a role in legitimizing new political orders. This paper provides, to my knowledge, the first systematic evidence on the ability of a charismatic leader to impact identity, coordinate a group and induce citizens to follow a new political order. It therefore provides new empirical evidence to the old debate over the relative roles of individuals in shaping historical outcomes, but also contributes to a large theoretical literature in economics that emphasizes the importance of leaders and postulates their ability to impact identity and coordinate the mass.

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Figure 1: Mapping the Visits




Figure 2: Kemal in Sivas Public Square, 1928



Source: Fotograflara Ataturk, Istanbul Cumhuriyet, 1939

Figure 3: Number and total share of cities visited for the first time, by year




Figure 5: Aggregate trends in names, by visit status




Figure 6: Impact of Kemal's Visit on Pure Turkish First Names (Event-Study)




Figure 7: Impact of Kemal's Visit on Arabic First Names (Event-Study)




Figure 8: Impact of Kemal's Visit on Religious First Names (Event-Study)




Table 1: Predictors of Kemal's visits

	(1) Full Sample
Province center	0.552*** (0.05)
District center	-0.045 (0.04)
Distance to railway 1919, in km	-0.000 (0.00)
Distance to Ankara in km.	-0.000 (0.00)
Strong Presence of Armenians	0.054 (0.06)
Strong Presence of Kurds	-0.071 (0.06)
Strong Presence of Greeks	-0.043 (0.05)
Distance to the nearest battlefield in km.	-0.000 (0.00)
Clubs before 1923	0.214*** (0.05)
Elevation	-0.000*** (0.00)
Coastal city	0.173*** (0.05)
Observations	504
R-squared	0.336

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Summary statistics of the main city-level database

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Visited	Non Visited
	mean	mean	mean
Population in 1927	8674.95	21441.12	3910.76
Population in 1935	8161.92	20359.42	4009.58
Province center	0.11	0.37	0.03
District center	0.80	0.84	0.78
Distance to railway 1919, in km	92.91	81.54	96.84
Distance to Ankara in km.	433.96	401.46	445.03
Strong Presence of Armenians	0.14	0.09	0.16
Strong Presence of Kurds	0.20	0.08	0.24
Strong Presence of Greeks	0.17	0.19	0.17
Distance to the nearest battlefield in km.	111.45	88.37	119.30
Clubs before 1923	0.15	0.36	0.08
Elevation	694.91	443.46	780.51
Coastal city	0.16	0.31	0.11
Observations	504	128	376

Table 3: Difference of means between Non-Visited and Visited cities in the restricted sample

	(1)	
	Difference of Means	
Population in 1927	-799.1	(-1.79)
Population in 1935	-737.9	(-1.81)
Province center	-0.0308	(-1.43)
District center	0.0352	(0.52)
Distance to railway 1919, in km	-0.214	(-0.01)
Distance to Ankara in km.	-24.47	(-0.95)
Strong Presence of Armenians	-0.0126	(-0.32)
Strong Presence of Kurds	0.0302	(0.71)
Strong Presence of Greeks	0.00110	(0.02)
Distance to the nearest battlefield in km.	11.62	(1.02)
Clubs before 1923	-0.0918	(-1.69)
Elevation	145.4	(1.83)
Coastal city	-0.0302	(-0.43)
Observations	205	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Effect of Kemal's visits on first names in *Pure Turkish*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
											Main	All
											Specification	Controls
Treated*Post	1.93*** (0.70)	2.02*** (0.72)	1.90*** (0.72)	1.64** (0.65)	1.86*** (0.68)	2.02*** (0.66)	1.93*** (0.70)	1.95*** (0.69)	1.90*** (0.69)	1.89*** (0.68)	1.75*** (0.67)	1.99*** (0.63)
Province center		Y									Y	Y
Club pre 1923			Y								Y	Y
Elevation				Y							Y	Y
Coast					Y						Y	Y
Dist. Rail 1919						Y						Y
Dist. Ank							Y					Y
Strong Arm.								Y				Y
Strong Kurd.									Y			Y
Dist. Battle										Y		Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean of outcome	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.490	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.490
s.d. of outcome	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.326	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.326
Observations	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971
R-squared	0.334	0.336	0.337	0.346	0.343	0.349	0.339	0.341	0.340	0.341	0.354	0.386

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-10 display results of the main specification, with only one control. Column 11 displays the baseline results, adding as controls the predictors of his visit (see Table 1). Column 12 shows results with all controls.

Table 5: Effect of Kemal's visits vs Inonu's visits on first names in *Pure Turkish*

	Restricted City Sample				Full City Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treated Kemal*Post	1.71** (0.67)		1.60** (0.70)	1.90** (0.79)	2.03*** (0.47)		1.94*** (0.47)	2.16*** (0.60)
Treated Inonu*Post		1.45 (1.03)	1.07 (1.09)	1.74 (1.19)		1.17** (0.53)	0.89* (0.53)	1.09** (0.54)
Treated Kemal&Inonu*Post				-1.73 (1.21)				-0.70 (0.74)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean of outcome	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.345	7.345	7.345	7.345
s.d. of outcome	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.333	6.912	6.912	6.912	6.912
Observations	5971	5971	5971	5971	14887	14887	14887	14887
R-squared	0.350	0.348	0.351	0.351	0.377	0.374	0.377	0.377

Standard errors clustered at the city level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) to (4) use the restricted sample, that is the sample excluding termini visited cities, non-visited cities not on the railway and very large cities. Columns (5) to (8) use the full city sample (504 cities), as for Inonu, we do not know which cities are targeted, and cannot create a similar sample.

Table 6: Heterogeneity analysis - presence of historical nationalistic clubs

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated*Post	1.71** (0.67)		1.90** (0.77)
Treated*Post*Club		0.78 (1.18)	-1.10 (1.42)
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
City FE	Y	Y	Y
Mean of outcome	7.475	7.475	7.475
s.d. of outcome	7.333	7.333	7.333
Observations	5971	5971	5971
R-squared	0.350	0.348	0.351

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Effect of Kemal's visits, by type of activity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treated*Post	1.71** (0.67)	1.45** (0.73)	0.33 (1.03)	1.83** (0.82)	0.11 (1.15)
Treated*Post*Speech		2.28** (1.07)			1.97 (1.30)
Treated*Post*Elite			2.12* (1.23)		2.07 (1.38)
Treated*Post*Mass				-0.44 (1.16)	
Treated*Post*Elite/Speech					0.50 (1.75)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean of outcome	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.475	7.475
s.d. of outcome	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.333	7.333
Observations	5971	5971	5971	5971	5971
R-squared	0.350	0.351	0.352	0.350	0.352

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1