Should regional airports be allowed to pay long-term operating aid to low-cost carriers?
Frédéric Marty
(1)
,
Estelle Malavolti
(2, 3)
Frédéric Marty
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 708
- IdHAL : frederic-marty
- ORCID : 0000-0002-9881-2036
- IdRef : 075972123
Estelle Malavolti
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 8543
- IdHAL : estelle-malavolti
- ORCID : 0000-0003-1346-0957
- IdRef : 070400318
Résumé
The guidelines on state aid, modified in 2014, provide simpler start-up aid rules for new routes and open the way to transitory operating aid schemes. These support measures, such as discounts on landing or terminal charges, can make sense from an economic point of view and can comply with the private market investor principle. For this purpose, we model the airport as a two-sided platform, performing a trade-off between its aeronautical and commercial activities. Furthermore, we highlight the relationship between the intensity of aid and the form of ex ante regulation of airport charges. If these charges are regulated using a price-cap mechanism, the airline may use its negotiating power to extract the majority of the surplus generated by the contract. Conversely, regulation based on a price-floor mechanism may make it possible to limit the airline’s ability to extract gains and thus reduce the level of the subsidy needed to balance the airport’s budget.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Should regional airports be allowed to pay long-term operating aid to low-cost carriers?
|
Résumé |
en
The guidelines on state aid, modified in 2014, provide simpler start-up aid rules for new routes and open the way to transitory operating aid schemes. These support measures, such as discounts on landing or terminal charges, can make sense from an economic point of view and can comply with the private market investor principle. For this purpose, we model the airport as a two-sided platform, performing a trade-off between its aeronautical and commercial activities. Furthermore, we highlight the relationship between the intensity of aid and the form of ex ante regulation of airport charges. If these charges are regulated using a price-cap mechanism, the airline may use its negotiating power to extract the majority of the surplus generated by the contract. Conversely, regulation based on a price-floor mechanism may make it possible to limit the airline’s ability to extract gains and thus reduce the level of the subsidy needed to balance the airport’s budget.
|
Auteur(s) |
Frédéric Marty
1
, Estelle Malavolti
2, 3
1
GREDEG -
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
( 185786 )
- GREDEG - Bâtiment 2 - Campus Azur du CNRS - 250 rue Albert Einstein - CS 10269 - F
06905 SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS Cedex
- France
2
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 1002422 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
3
ENAC -
Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile
( 380071 )
- 7 avenue Edouard Belin
CS 54005
31055 Toulouse cedex 4
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2020-09-21
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2020-09-21
|
Volume |
70
|
Numéro |
2
|
Page/Identifiant |
149-166
|
URL éditeur |
https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-revue-economique-2019-2-page-149.htm?contenu=resume
|
Commentaire |
version anglaise d'un article paru en 2019 dans la version française de la revue
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Collaboration/Projet |
|
Mots-clés |
en
regulation, airports, competition law
|
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