Voter coordination in elections : a case for approval voting
1
Nokia Bell Labs
2 LINCS - Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication Sciences
3 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
4 PSE - Paris School of Economics
5 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
6 ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris
7 CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
2 LINCS - Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication Sciences
3 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
4 PSE - Paris School of Economics
5 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
6 ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris
7 CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
François Durand
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 3255
- IdHAL : fradurand
- ORCID : 0000-0002-0861-0028
- IdRef : 192885146
Antonin Macé
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 17445
- IdHAL : antonin-mace
- ORCID : 0000-0002-3076-9633
- IdRef : 187539375
Résumé
We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider three rules, that differ on the number of candidates that voters can support: Plurality (one), Anti-Plurality (two) and Approval Voting (one or two). We show that the Condorcet winner is always elected at some equilibrium under Approval Voting, and that this rule provides better welfare guarantees than Plurality. We then numerically study a dynamic process of political tâtonnement which delivers rich insights. The Condorcet winner is virtually always elected under Approval Voting, but not under the other rules. The dominance of Approval Voting is robust to several alternative welfare criteria and the introduction of expressive voters.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Pré-publication, Document de travail |
Titre |
en
Voter coordination in elections : a case for approval voting
|
Résumé |
en
We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider three rules, that differ on the number of candidates that voters can support: Plurality (one), Anti-Plurality (two) and Approval Voting (one or two). We show that the Condorcet winner is always elected at some equilibrium under Approval Voting, and that this rule provides better welfare guarantees than Plurality. We then numerically study a dynamic process of political tâtonnement which delivers rich insights. The Condorcet winner is virtually always elected under Approval Voting, but not under the other rules. The dominance of Approval Voting is robust to several alternative welfare criteria and the introduction of expressive voters.
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Auteur(s) |
François Durand
1, 2
, Antonin Macé
3, 4, 5, 6
, Matias Nunez
7
1
Nokia Bell Labs
( 355538 )
- Murray Hill, NJ
- États-Unis
2
LINCS -
Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication Sciences
( 541966 )
- 23 avenue d'Italie 75013 Paris
- France
3
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
CNRS -
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
( 441569 )
- France
6
ENS-PSL -
École normale supérieure - Paris
( 59704 )
- 45, Rue d'Ulm - 75230 Paris cedex 05
- France
7
CREST -
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
( 2579 )
- 5, Avenue Henry Le Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau
- France
|
Page/Identifiant |
63 p.
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2023-11
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Référence interne |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Approval voting, Poisson games, Strategic voting, Condorcet consistency, Fictitious play, Expressive voting
|
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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