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Anna Dessertine, Camille Noûs

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Hybrid territorialisation: a reconfiguration of rural spaces through gold mining in Upper Guinea

Dessertine Anna
Research Fellow at the French Institute for Sustainable Development (IRD, UMR 215 Prodig), assigned to the National Institute for Planning and Urbanism (INAU, Rabat, Morocco) since December 2020.
UMR 215 Prodig
Campus CONDORCET
5, cours des Humanités
93322 Aubervilliers Cedex
FRANCE
Anna.dessertine@ird.fr

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Hybrid territorialisation: a reconfiguration of rural spaces through gold mining in Upper Guinea

In May 2019, women gold diggers blocked the road towards Léro, a town in north-eastern Guinea, which was experiencing strong demographic and urban growth after the arrival of the mining company, La Société Minière de Dinguiraye (SMD). They were protesting their forceful eviction from SMD’s slag heaps on which they had been illegally prospecting for gold, during which operation two of the gold diggers had been wounded by a security guard, a Guinean soldier temporarily seconded to the company. This was far from an isolated episode in this area, where gold digging is the main source of income for inhabitants, who practise little agriculture. Drawn by the concentration of gold dust in the slag heaps, women risk violence by prospecting for gold on land allocated for industrial exploitation. The frequency of this kind of violence has been increasing since the beginning of 2019, reflecting escalating tensions and conflicts associated with increased private appropriation brought about by industrial mining in a region where gold digging is primarily a mobile activity, and customary tenure allows for flexible demarcation of spaces (Dessertine, 2017). This article aims to unravel the modalities and the socio-spatial effects of introducing the territorial model of mining in a region where artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) is multisecular. I consider it a hybrid process that ultimately leads to the consolidation of the Guinean state’s territorial control. More generally, I question the delimitation in practice by highlighting how previously negotiable local boundaries become more definitive, exclusionary, and integrated into daily practices.

This perspective falls within the “spatial fix” narrative (Harvey, 1982), which refers to “capitalism’s insatiable drive to resolve its inner crisis tendencies by geographical expansion and geographical restructuring” (Harvey, 2001, p. 24). As such, the territorialisation process is considered inherent to the logics of global capitalism and state power, even if at first sight they seem contradictory. In the mining context, the spatial fix is manifested through mining concessions, which have emblematically been analysed as “enclaves” that are strongly territorialised and securitised, while simultaneously being deeply integrated into the global, neo-liberal economy (Ferguson, 2005, p. 380; Hönke, 2010). Recent studies have made this analysis denser and more nuanced by showing the plurality of historical changes, power rationalities (Rubbers, 2019), regulations (Côte and Korf, 2018; Bolay and Knierzinger, 1

2021), and contestations emerging from and around these concessions (Pijpers, 2019). Similarly, this specific spatial form has been associated with accumulative processes of dispossession (Harvey, 2003), especially concerning land, enacted through acquisitions by mining corporations (see for instance Ayelazuno, 2011; Geenen, 2014; Holden et al., 2011). Mining concessions, from a dynamic and spatial perspective, appear to be enclosing spaces, leading to various forms of exclusion of marginalising gold diggers and local populations (Fisher, 2007; Tschakert, 2009), hampering recourse to national law (Szablowski, 2019; Dessentine, 2019), and preventing access to resources (Munkherdene and Sneath, 2018).

While recognising the valuable contributions of the aforementioned studies, this article differs from them in some ways. First, it considers the notion of territorialisation, in its tangible form, as a new “way of doing space” (De Certeau, 1990) constructed through interactions and practices – sometimes conflictual – between local populations, agents of mining companies, and state authorities. In this perspective, the spatial process of territorialisation, and practices of delimitation on the ground, are seen as more determinant than the spaces themselves or their characterisation. Further, since territorialisation is the starting point of the argument, I will describe the diversity of actors in the “mining arena” (Le Meur, 2015), from gold diggers to mining companies and state agents, and consider their particular relationship to this way of doing space. I demonstrate that processes of spatial fixation/delimitation driven by the mining industry, particularly targeting the mobility of gold diggers, have laid the groundwork for a form of territorial organisation that serves a bureaucratic state rationality.

Indeed, the process of territorialisation also refers to a political process of spatial rationalisation; the establishment of delimited surfaces simplifies spatial organisation and renders society more “legible” to state bureaucracy (Scott, 1998). Yet, the state often appears in the background of studies on mining, discharging its prerogatives (Hönke, 2010) following processes of privatisation (Hibou, 1998). Drawing from this literature, I argue that this privatisation does not signify the withdrawal of the state, but on the contrary, enables its redeployment, or even development, along the lines of the “concession regimes” seen in Belgian Congo (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2001). Here, redeployment will be analysed through the lens of territorialisation and its practices from below, encouraging an understanding of territorialisation as a manifestation of hybrid governance (Geenen, 2016), characterised by ambivalent inclusion/exclusion and the ambiguous roles of the actors of mining securitisation.
1.1 The context of gold mining in Guinea

Guinea is a West African country with a population of nearly 13 million people; it is rich in natural resources, particularly bauxite and gold. It was the only French colony to reject continued colonial subordination in favour of immediate independence via a constitutional referendum in 1958, making its history unique in the West African region (Schmidt, 2009). This is associated with a strong socialist leaning in its various political regimes, with particularly severe and widespread political violence, an important element when considering the violence associated with territorialisation described in this article. The share of mining in the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is about 30% according to the World Bank, which is certainly a significant share, but not as large as in rentier states. Guinea’s potential, however, has attracted international attention and investments have been pouring in since 2015 for two main reasons: first, the nation’s transition to a democratic regime in 2010, despite the limited applicability of this term in the current context; second, the end of the Ebola outbreak in 2014–2015, which accelerated the pace of investments.

In particular, the region of Upper Guinea, which I discuss here, has been experiencing a gold boom since a rise in gold prices between 2008 and 2012, although gold digging activities have been in practice here for several centuries, especially in the Bouré area, which used to supply gold to the Ghana, Mali, and Songhai empires (Niane and Ki-Zerbo, 1991). These activities have historically involved seasonal mobility and temporary mining camps (Bolay, 2014, 2016b; Dessertine, 2013, 2016), which are gradually becoming ever more surrounded, quite literally, by the land of private companies acquired with the support of public authorities. In fact, in parallel with ASGM, industrial exploitation has also played a significant role in redefining spaces as demarcated areas, with reference to national law and fixing exploitation spatially. This is in addition to the older concessions of the Guinean Gold Company (Société Aurifère de Guinée [SAG], a subsidiary of the South African multinational group, AngloGold Ashanti) and the Dinguiraye Mining Company (SMD, a subsidiary of the Russian multinational group, Nordgold), issued in the 1990s; since 2014–2015, several

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3 Without going into detail, a so-called “rentier” state has at least four characteristics: a) “rent situations”, b) of external origin, c) which concern only a restricted group of individuals, and d) whose government is the main beneficiary (Béblawi, 1987, pp. 50–53).
prospecting permits, criss-crossing rural areas, have been issued. In 2016, the Ministry of Mines and Geology indicated that the Guinea produced between 15 and 25 tonnes of gold, 15 to 17 of which was produced through industrial mining; the Central Bank indicated that more than 19 tonnes were also produced by ASGM activities (see Rapport ITIE-Guinée, 2017, p. 34).

From a spatial point of view, the territorialisation process must be considered as only one of several forms of appropriation of land on a legalised, geometric surface, following the Euclidean model (Le Roy, 2011); in Upper Guinea, it is far from being the most common. Historically, spaces in this region are organised following a topological model, just as in other West African regions (Journet-Diallo, 2007), where spaces can be considered topocentric – defined by their centre and not their boundaries (Dessertine, 2017). This form of spatial appropriation reverses the territorial perspective by considering the centre as more determinant and boundaries as unfixed and negotiable. The same is true for ASGM spaces, which change constantly according to gold diggers’ mobility: their “frontiers” are flexible (Bryceson and Geenen, 2016) and never firmly fixed (Grätz, 2004). Therefore, rather than being delimited territories, they constitute ephemeral points between which the gold diggers move (Werthmann, 2010; Dessertine, 2016). Combined with the forms of appropriation allowed by national law (from private property to concession permits), this multi-tiered system of land rights renders the adoption of the territorial model particularly problematic due to the increased competition for differentiated access to resources (Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007). In Upper Guinea, this competition has increased even further due to the multiplication of mining permits, even if the majority of permits are exploration permits. As it is possible to begin the analysis at the prospecting phase, this region is particularly suitable for enabling the conditions that breed the territorialisation process. Indeed, the expansion of permits has resulted in reduced ASGM spaces, which in turn has led to growing demands from local populations and gold diggers. This, in turn, has led the government to mobilise its security forces, sometimes to repressively evict people, thereby explicitly calling into question the political dimension of the territorialisation process and the role of the state.

How does the increasingly explicit introduction of territorial spatiality in the topological context of ASGM lead to tighter control of gold diggers’ mobility and the sedentarisation of individuals deemed “too mobile” (a key issue in the formation of states)? While at the exploration stage the territorialisation process appears to be in its infancy, during the

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4 With the modernisation of the mining cadastral, a case management system was installed in 2016: *Guinee Cadastre Minier*, 22 December 2020, http://guinee.cadastreminier.org/.
exploitation phase, spatial anchoring, the exercise of power relationships, and exclusionary processes are made far more visible, in particular through the increased presence of security forces since 2015, as evidenced by the events at Léro, and the expulsion of gold diggers from the SMD slag heaps. This mobilisation of the Guinean state’s security services, especially the army, to secure mining permits reflects the political violence linked to the process of extractive territorialisation, which leads to dispossession and forced displacement (Szablowski, 2007a; Bolay, 2016a, 2017; Dessertine, 2019). This use of state violence by private companies also highlights the ambiguity of the relation between the private and public sectors, which lays the ground for more hybrid procedures, such as territorialisation. More generally, by dealing with the process of territorialisation, I highlight the political reconfigurations that the transformation of the gold mining sector in Upper Guinea induces.

This article is based on a 20-month ethnography, conducted between 2011 and 2018, using mainly qualitative methods. I first spent more than a year between 2011 and 2013 in a village near Kankan, the second-largest city in the country. From this village, for nearly six months, I studied gold miners in different prefectures of the region and carried out more than 100 interviews. During shorter stays, between 2017 and 2019, I focused on expanding my research to other actors, especially the soldiers of Camp Soundiata Keïta of Kankan, with whom I conducted nearly 40 interviews and whom I followed in the field. Since 2018, I have also carried out research in various mining villages for a project on the impact of mining mobility on the spread of Lassa haemorrhagic fever and to observe the transformation of mining activities in the region, in particular their mechanisation.

The following section analyses reconfigurations in ASGM spaces and mobility due to the mechanisation of mining, the development of the territorial model, and the expansion of industrial mining establishments. Then, to better understand the spatial manifestations of the implementation of industrial mining, I pay particular attention to the prospection phase, the moment when limits are laid down in an area where mobile ASGM takes place. This first part thus focuses on territorialisation in the extractive context and questions the processes of spatial fixation and mobility. The last section concerns mining land securitisation through the mobilisation of the Guinean military to protect mining permits. Introducing more explicitly the role of the state, we will see that the presence of gendarmes or soldiers allows both for the sovereignty of companies on their territory, and the consolidation of state territorial control, demonstrating the hybrid character of territorialisation in this region.

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5 Project LAROC 2 (Lassa Fever in Guinea and Sierra Leone: rodent-human cohabitation and disease control, DFG-ANR FI 1781 / 1-1).
2 A decade of change in Guinean gold mining: the introduction of the territorial model

This section provides an overview of more than a decade of socio-spatial transformations in gold mining spaces and of mobility in Upper Guinea. It begins with a description of ASGM spaces before the expansion of the mining industry and the introduction of the territorial model. First, I discuss the mechanisation of the activity with the introduction of metal detectors, showing how it masculinised increasingly itinerant mining mobility. Second, I analyse the destruction of gold mining camps and the expulsion operations led by Guinean security forces in 2015–2016 as a logic of fixation of ASGM activity. We will see how this polarised gold diggers’ mobility around both hyper-mobility and spatial anchoring. Finally, I explore the mining industry in practice by focusing on the prospecting phase and how it narrows ASGM spaces. If ASGM spaces are created by miners’ mobility, which allows for the ephemeral emergence of multiple sites destined to disappear and reappear, the mining industry legally fixes the exploitation spatially and temporally by delimiting exclusionary areas in accordance with national law. This part aims, thus, to unravel these two spatial trends – fixation and exclusion – which appear to lay the ground for an extractive territorialisation and, ultimately, larger territorialisation processes.

2.1 ASGM mobility before the expansion of mining permits: seasonality and hyper-mobility

In 2011, the ASGM spaces I went to emerged and vanished depending on the seasonal mobility of gold diggers and the duration of a vein’s exploitation. Both men and women went to work together in mixed groups of five to eight individuals. The men dug the pits with pickaxes while the women usually carried bags of gravel and washed the gold. The women’s role in the work group was as valued as the men’s, and the sharing out among all the members of the group was equitable. The female presence was highly visible, as in other West African countries where ASGM is commonly practised (Hentschel and al., 2003). Some of the women were there alone because they were running away from unhappy marriages, escaping domestic violence, or for similar reasons, but most often they came along with their husbands and children (Dessertine, 2016). Mining mobility can, therefore, involve entire families.

For more details on ASGM techniques in Guinea, see, for example, Dessertine (2016), Lanzano and Arnaldi di Balme (2017), and Bolay (2014).
building their own makeshift shelters in temporary camps, usually located a few hundred metres from a village that claims ownership over the exploited land.

The most widespread land tenure system in the region can be considered a “tutoring” relationship (Chauveau, 2007), where the first arrival delegates tenure rights to later arrivals, integrating them into the local power hierarchy (Dessertine, 2017). The highest territorial authority is the village chief, the sotikëmo in the Maninka language, the eldest of the founding lineage of the village. Authority is then subdivided in the manner of nesting dolls down to the different heads of households – the oldest representatives of the founding lineage of each household. Thus, an individual who aims to settle in the village would first have to ask the permission of whichever head of household owns the land that interests them; the sotikëmo would intervene only in the event of a dispute. In mining areas, it is not about giving land to an individual or a family to settle on (or cultivate), but a question of managing the arrival of hundreds or even thousands of people. Supervision of mining sites, therefore, requires a specific organisation, led by a damanti (the “master/head of the mine”) and a group of tombolomanw, a sort of local mining police, which I elaborate on in the third part of the article.

Based on research conducted between 2011 and 2014, Bolay highlights other forms of mobility than seasonal movements, which he describes as “itinerant” – characterised as opportunistic and most often practised by young single men (2016b, 2017). When I returned in 2012–2013, the itinerant mobility had intensified in conjunction with the increased mechanisation of techniques. Even though artisanal exploitation was still being practised, it was often coupled with mechanised techniques, especially when it came to washing the ore to extract gold. Some miners also used laundry spaces with sluice boxes. Thus, the use of the single term “artisanal” to describe exploitation in this context is becoming more and more obsolete; metal detectors, motorcycles, and the use of small crushers and motor pumps have all become common.

The main socio-spatial consequence of this mechanisation is the masculinisation of mobile mining activities (Dessertine, 2016), first, because of stereotypes and patterns of labour division conceptualised along gendered lines; according to the inhabitants surveyed, women do not “cope well with the machinery”. Second, and, above all, this masculinisation resulted from reasons more directly related to the nature of mobility itself. Indeed, in the eyes of the inhabitants, respectable mobility for women is incompatible with the instability of such itinerant mobility, which does not involve any permanent settlement. Detectors make it possible to cover larger swathes of land quickly, sometimes encouraging miners to sleep in
the bush or the central courtyards of households in the surrounding villages. A woman adopting this uninterrupted form of mobility might be mistaken for a prostitute or an unaccompanied woman, something that the inhabitants strongly frown upon. However, women were, and still are, present at exploitation sites, lifting bags of gravel and washing gold, including in some mechanised laundries. Nevertheless, the share of women identifying as the wives of gold miners, or as itinerant miners themselves, decreased progressively during my successive stays, while I encountered a growing number of women coming from the village that owned the area under exploitation. In some areas, villagers even forced outside miners to work with indigenous women to centralise gold mining revenues. Thus, women have remained active in ASGM but are less involved in its mobility as compared to men.

The mechanisation of techniques has not only reconfigured the actual mobility of gold miners, but it has also helped diversify the mining population through the transnational movement of miners. We find, for instance, more and more “Burkinabé wells” at Guinean sites (Lanzano and Arnaldi Di Balme, 2017); these wells require wooden scaffolding to exploit gold located deeper down in “submarine” mines. In such mines, wells are dug underwater through the beds of rivers and streams using generators and hoses – like garden ones – to provide miners with oxygen. This last technique has grown in popularity among some gold miners, thanks to knowledge from ex-diamond miners, who use similar techniques.

Without going into detail about the effects that the mechanisation and diversification of techniques can have on the way operations are organised, we have seen that, in spatial terms, these reconfigurations have tended to masculinise the mobile workforce and, in some sense, to tie women down spatially. This has forced those outside of exploitation sites to take on other activities, such as making sumbala (a spice obtained from the seeds of the néré tree or Parkia biglobosa), for example, in the sub-prefecture of Bate around Kankan. In 2013, non-mechanised gold exploitation therefore coexisted with itinerant, mechanised, more volatile, and masculinised gold mining activity, giving rise to temporary spaces around shelters.

2.2 The end of large temporary mining camps or the polarisation of ASGM mobility

The end of 2015 marked a major turning point in the reconfiguration of ASGM mobility: violent conflicts in Kintinian between the SAG and some inhabitants scheduled for relocation led to government action to secure mining areas and, in particular, the decision to burn the
largest temporary camps. Over and above being sites of conflicts between local populations and mining companies, the camps were generally considered by the state authorities to be centres of lawlessness, various forms of trafficking, and havens for foreign nationals not authorised to practise ASGM.\(^8\) Mixed missions officially aimed at evicting people (missions de déguerpissement in French), involving the military, gendarmes, and police, were conducted at the end of 2015 and in early 2016; they were still being organised regularly in early 2019. The official objective of these missions is to secure the mining companies’ lands by expelling gold diggers and burning large temporary mining camps, as was the case in Doko, near the Guinea–Mali border. In 2016, the major temporary camps, including hundreds — sometimes thousands — of shelters were destroyed, although there are still small clusters of shelters on the outskirts of villages.

In 2019, I paid several visits to the mining village of Banjoula, about 40 kilometres from the Malian border. In the centre are the homes of the permanent inhabitants of the village, arranged in a circle and becoming gradually more scattered. The house of the village chief and eldest male of the founding lineage is a few dozen metres from the central square; it offers shelter to a few young male gold miners from other parts. Many others, including women, have come to settle here and have even in some cases built huts or brick buildings on the outskirts of the village. Passing through the village, in addition to huts and buildings, are makeshift shelters that serve as houses for the miners and, in some cases, showers/toilets.

Water is available; a small plant has even been set up to bottle and sell water from the well in bags. Moreover, water is sold by the bucket at 2,000 GNF (2 EUR) per unit for hot water. Shops selling air conditioners, cafés, small restaurants, and gold dealers can be found along the central street, at the end of which is a gendarmerie, where assaults and other offences are reported, in theory, before being referred to the nearest sub-prefecture. This growth of mining villages is not new, but the destruction of the temporary mining camps seems to have led to the establishment of longer-term setups inside the villages close to ASGM sites. Since initiating the systematic use of missions to evict gold miners in 2015–2016, the Guinean government has, in a way, forced miners to build at least a hut in a village near the exploited lands rather than just a rough shelter, to avoid being banned from exploitation (and, thus, expelled from the site).

Gold diggers’ mobility has as such gradually become polarised around more durable installations, leading to the construction of buildings on one hand, and forms of hyper-

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\(^8\) Article 53 of Section III, “Artisanal Exploitation Permit” of the Mining Code, amended in 2013 (Law L/2013/053/CNT).
mobility involving only temporary installations for a few days (or no longer than a few months or weeks as in the case of former mining camps) within villages on the other. This hyper-mobility is also reinforced, as we have seen, by technical mechanisation and obliges some gold diggers to regularly come and go from the villages by motorbike. In the village Djirilan, where I stayed for nearly two years between 2011 and 2019, several gold miners would make the round trip in a day or every three or four days. Other miners preferred a more long-lasting arrangement and built a hut or concrete building in a mining village, thereby participating in its expansion or even its urbanisation. In such cases, miners usually constructed buildings in their home villages, rather than investing in the mining village where they worked. This resulted of alternating, twin residences in mining and agricultural villages, in which rice cultivation predominates. The consequences of this twinning take various forms, including economic effects, because the income from ASGM can finance the mechanisation of rice, or marital effects, as some miners have a wife in each village, signifying the emergence of new marital practices in a general context of village endogamy.

Since 2015, ASGM activity has become more fixed due to the government’s control over spaces of exploitation, which has prompted gold diggers to either adopt quasi-uninterrupted forms of mobility or else to settle down in fixed locations by building or renting houses. This has considerably changed ASGM spaces from being large camps with thousands of people to little areas on the periphery of mining villages, becoming for some relatively durable homesteads. At the same time, more and more exploration industrial permits criss-cross the region, contributing not to only the fixation of mining activity, but also driving the development of the territorial, geometric, delimited model.

We now focus on this process of extractive territorialisation, starting from the tangible implementation phase, that is to say, the prospecting phase. By analysing the prospecting phase and the role of geology in socio-political reconfigurations (Luning, 2014; Weszkalnys, 2015; D’Avignon, 2018), as the basis of an “in-depth geopolitics” (Luning and Pijpers, 2017), I subsequently consider how this phase sets the scene for asymmetrical relationships between gold miners/local populations and mining company agents on the one hand, and exclusionary processes on the other.

2.3 Extractive territorialisation in practice

The most stereotypical form that comes to mind when thinking about the mining industry is the mining “enclave”. At first sight, certain spaces such as SAG city, a subsidiary of the
multinational AngloGold Ashanti, fit the model of the “enclave”: there is an enclosure, automatic barrier, the presence of guards, the military or police, barbed wire, neighbourhoods in which employees are grouped by nationality, a canteen, a satellite connection, a school, roads with a 20 km/h speed limit, etc. This city is located outside the nearest town, Siguiri, and accessible by a large, regularly cleared track. We find this same configuration in Nordgold’s city for foreigners near Léro, also in Upper Guinea; it is electrified and has residents of various nationalities rarely seen in town. These spaces, as though grafted on from the outside, constitute self-contained locations that are, however, far less isolated from the surrounding environment than they may at first appear. For example, slag heaps (mountains of mining waste) located on company lands are often exploited by gold miners, as mentioned in the introduction, and informal trade may arise around checkpoints, typically with shopkeepers selling food (Pijpers, 2019).

In the Guinean context, the concession is far from being the most widespread mining title. As in many other countries, the Guinean Mining Code, 2011, amended in 2013, distinguishes between three main types of mining titles: the industrial or semi-industrial mining exploration permit (Title II, Chapter 1, Section 1), the industrial or semi-industrial mining operating permit (Title II, Chapter 1, Section 2), and the mining concession (Title II, Chapter 1, Section 3). However, industrial, semi-industrial, mechanised, and ASGM areas are juxtaposed, compete with each other, and take on many different forms. There is a multitude of smaller companies, especially junior prospecting ones. Some of these companies, such as the one I will discuss next, have a few bulldozers, shovels, one or two 100-tonne trucks, two or three big crushers, and a few dozen employees; others are semi-industrial, with a single bulldozer, a pickup, a crusher, and sluice boxes. During the 2015–2016 eviction missions, it was not only the miners who were expelled from certain sites but also foreign groups of (semi)-industrial miners who were exploiting the gold illegally (without a mining permit or with only a prospecting permit) and whose equipment was requisitioned. In the military reports to the minister of defence that I consulted in 2017, there were, for instance, photos of three Russian nationals who had been arrested, with their Chevrolet car and two crushers that had been confiscated.

This heterogeneity shows how difficult it is to differentiate in practice between industrial and ASGM exploitation, and therefore highlights possible links and interweaving between the different extractive spaces. However, a structuring element distinguishes them: their legal translation into space and the socio-political implications that flow from it. In Guinea, most titles are industrial or semi-industrial exploration permits, and the law is rather vague about
what kind of relations permit holders should entertain with resident populations or artisanal
gold miners working under the permit. However, the amended 2011 Mining Code includes
new provisions for community development, in particular through the setting up of the
Economic Development Fund. As such, the holder of a mining permit must sign a local
development agreement with the local resident community and contribute 0.5% of the
company’s turnover. But the regulations are obscure for the prospection stage, leading to the
creation of highly asymmetrical relationships between company agents and local
populations/gold diggers. In an interview, a Senegalese geologist (who works for an English
mining company operating in Senegal and is undertaking prospection in Upper Guinea)
explained to me how areas rich in gold are identified: “we arrive in an unknown area of
ground, we ask [the inhabitants of a village for example], are there any gold mining areas
here, near the village. If they say yes, [we ask] if we can visit them, then we do (laughs). So,
you don’t say, long-term the company want to exploit them [myself]? No, no, no, no (laughs)
we do not say that, certainly not.”

From the outset, interactions between gold diggers and mining company personnel are
biased: gold diggers direct mining companies towards the most promising lands, often hoping
for future rewards in the form of employment or income. The chief of a mining village
explained that residents helped geologists with coring in the hope of securing future
employment. This ambiguous relationship between gold miners and company agents initially
stems from asymmetrical access to information. The aspects that the mining company agents
conceal or, at least, their vagueness concerning future exploitation conditions give rise to
interpretative gaps and exploit the confusion between state actions and those of companies.
When conflicts arise, the question of responsibility is fuzzy – it sometimes lies with the
customary authorities at the local and/or state level, and sometimes with company executives
or ill-intentioned villagers (Dessertine, 2019a). This relational ambiguity is further reinforced
by the fact that some junior companies employ villagers from the exploitation area, as a lot of
inhabitants pointed out, to a much greater extent than do the larger companies.

Similar dynamics can be seen at the prospection stage: “To start with,” continues the
geologist, “you do some soil sampling. For example, we opted for lines of 400. This means
making lines 400 metres long and then, every 100 metres, you take a sample of the soil, at a
depth of between 20 and 50 centimetres. For this, you can involve gold diggers or locals. We
pay them a little… you know how it is. After that, if the results come back positive, you dig

9 For more information on the support mechanisms in the Guinean mining legislation, see Lado and Kim (2019).
some trenches, go a bit deeper, one metre, two, even four. If the results are good, you begin sampling. Only after that do you ask an independent consultancy company to do a feasibility study.” In theory, permits are issued based on this feasibility study. Prospecting lines enable the mining companies’ geologists to locate the most promising areas and lead to an instrumentalisation of the knowledge of gold miners and local villagers, who are not equally involved in the setting up of the mine, because of the patchiness of available information at this stage.

To finish, the geologist I interviewed then explained the spatial evolution of prospection permits: prospection permits are valid for three years and then can be renewed. If so, the company has to give back to the state half of the supercify. The geologist gave an example of a licence that covers 100 km² in 2017, which in 2020, will be reduced to 50 km². Redefinition of permit limitations between the prospection and mining phases reflects a policy of liberalisation of the mining land by the state, oriented towards intensive exploitation, which, combined with the relational asymmetries described earlier, clearly shows the ambiguity, even cynicism, underlying relations in the field of mining between the state, local populations, and mining companies. The state renders the gold miners’ position more precarious through securitisation that prevents their access and blocks ASGM operations. Moreover, by cooperating with the staff of mining companies, such as geologists, gold miners paradoxically lay the foundation for their own potential, future exclusion (once the exploitation begins, as I show later, it becomes easy for a mining company to “kick them out” by mobilising the army). Then, mining companies, the last element in this triad, get the benefit not only of state support in acquiring land, but also of the best lands, identified for them by the gold diggers themselves. These asymmetric modes of interactions between inhabitants, artisanal gold miners, and mining companies are fundamental to the logic of extractive territorialisation and make possible the creation of exclusionary spaces, symbolised by “enclaves”.

I now go even further to show how this territorialisation is driven by mining companies and takes hybrid forms by growing and consolidating the state territorial control.

3 From an extractive to a “hybrid territorialisation”

In this part, I analyse the territorialisation process by focusing on the diversity of actors in the mining spaces’ securitisation. I show how their presence defines in concrete terms more or less negotiable boundaries and refer to different authorities in hybrid modalities. I demonstrate how territorial rationalisation driven by the private sector (here, the mining
companies) is made possible through the use of political violence (here, specifically the Guinean Army) and how mining territorialisation could establish the foundations of state territorialisation by introducing and diffusing it, and thereby familiarising populations with a more bureaucratic form of land management. The state does not appear privatised nor mining companies completely autonomous: the combination of diverse actors – some navigating between formality and informality, as we will see for the tombolomanw, and some navigating within the public and private domains, as in the case of the soldiers hired by companies – appears to be foundational for a hybrid territorialisation and for securing mining permits, but, above all, for consolidating state control.

First, I question the ambivalent relationship between the historical figures responsible for securitisation of mining sites, the tombolomanw, and the gendarmes and soldiers, who are part of the official system. Then, I interrogate the ambiguity linked to the gendarmes'/soldiers’ presence: while it tends to create internal and exclusionary boundaries, it is sometimes also perceived by local populations as wilful inclusion by the state in areas where it is generally considered absent. Finally, I show how the ambivalence and ambiguity characteristic of these relationships create a hybrid territorialisation, which is increasingly spreading through rural areas.

3.1 The multiple forms of securitisation of mining areas

In gold mining areas, the historical and customary figures of law enforcement are the tombolomanw – men with experience in ASGM, working together to secure the area under the authority of a damanti who controls access to exploitation of the resources. This access is usually paid for when exploitation is mechanised: in 2013 in Kourémalé, the Guinea–Malian border town, for example, a group of miners had to pay the damanti a tax of 500,000 GNF (about 50 EUR) to use a metal detector. Mechanisation has reinforced the monetary taxation of small-scale and semi-mechanised gold mining activities.10 This is because when gold diggers operate on an artisanal basis, taxation is generally applied to the product of the mining: the tombolomanw come to collect bags from the site; for example, 2 bags from every 10 went to one of the villages I visited in 2017. In some villages, the taxation is used for local development, and profits from ASGM are sometimes used to build mosques, schools, or

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10 This local taxation is an important issue for the government since it is not covered under legal regulations.
prisons, but not systematically so. Unlike with industrial mining, AGSM miners have no national legal obligation to contribute to local development.\(^{11}\)

The \textit{tombolomanw} generally come from the village that owns the land being exploited, although sometimes gold diggers from elsewhere can also occupy this position, especially if they have lived in the village for several years. They organise and monitor the exploitation sites while ensuring a form of local justice. As such, they have been considered “vigilante groups” (Grätz, 2007), defined by Favarel-Garrigues and Gayer (2016) as non-state actors who implement a certain number of “coercive collective practices” and exercise a form of “justice” oriented towards the moralisation of social life (p. 28). This is particularly relevant in areas such as mining sites described by the local populations as long neglected by the state.

Nevertheless, the \textit{tombolomanw} are recognised as stakeholders by the official security system and are supposed to work hand-in-hand with state agents. For instance, in 2019, at a mining site I was visiting, a man who stole money from a woman was imprisoned in the gendarmerie after the \textit{tombolomanw} brought him there. The gendarmes said they would take him the following day to the nearest sub-prefecture to be put on trial. In such cases, there is a form of continuity from the \textit{tombolomanw} to the state authorities: the \textit{tombolomanw} are integrated as stakeholders in official securitisation and become part of a system that official actors (military and police) describe as “sprawling”, since it regularly involves referring offences to higher levels.

This tentacular relationship that the state maintains with the \textit{tombolomanw} is not unilateral and allows for considerable negotiations and detours, testifying to its hybrid nature. Securitisation is, above all, relational and does not follow a particularly linear, institutional path. Some conflicts are settled on the spot by the gendarmes or military if they manage to convince the defendant to repay what he has stolen; for example, in some instances, even the \textit{tombolomanw} assert direct justice outside of national law. In 2012, some \textit{tombolomanw} had a gold digger’s hand cut off after he was accused of theft at a site I visited. At another site, a gold digger who had been accused of assault was punished by being tied to a tree and whipped.\(^{12}\)

\(^{11}\) Section III of the 2011 Mining Code regulates the granting of artisanal mining permits, mainly administered by the National Directorate of Mines. These authorisations for a maximum area of half a hectare for gold and a maximum depth of 30 m can be transformed into semi-industrial operating permits if a feasibility, environmental, and social impact study is undertaken and approved. Given that, as we have seen, gold mining is fundamentally a mobile activity, the regulations appear to be out of step with practice and, I, for my part, have never met gold miners with official authorisation.

\(^{12}\) These punishments were also a means of applying Islamic law, occasionally referred to as Sharia law, in a country that is 90% Muslim.
The *tombolomanw* are also expected to maintain order in the surrounding areas, including in villages transformed by the arrival of diggers (proliferation of cafés, diversification and spatial extension of markets, etc.). In this context, *tombolomanw* are guarantors of social order in mines and surrounding areas, which require continuous redefinition in contexts of high mobility. However, this phenomenon is far from systematic and their relationship with miners remains ambiguous. Since they justify their use of violence on moral grounds, there are as many forms of morality as exploited sites. Thus, of more than 150 gold diggers interviewed, 130 said they feared the *tombolomanw* far more than the military or gendarmes.

I next analyse the modalities of the military presence and show how the military participates in the boundarisation of mining permits and the legitimisation of territorial violence, particularly expulsion. We then see that this imposition of legitimate state violence – which does not cancel out other forms of violence like that perpetuated by the *tombolomanw* – is not only perceived by the locals as violence targeting gold diggers, but also as the state (re)discovering interest in these outlying areas.

### 3.2 Beyond permits: ambivalent security and hopes of national inclusion

In a mining village near the town of Léro, a gendarmerie was built in 2016 in an ad hoc manner. A mud hut serves as the commander’s office and a small adjoining building has a room in which the officers rest and another in which prisoners are kept, before being taken, if required, to the nearest sub-prefecture. When I stayed there in 2019, a new commander had just arrived two days previously. He did not yet know the area; he had been sent from Conakry, where he had been responsible for the security of a well-known political figure. While the reasons for appointing the commander to this remote area were unclear, the other gendarmes posted there welcomed him warmly because, on his first day, he installed electricity and purchased a large television. He wanted to make this gendarmerie more “comfortable”, and present a “good image of the state”. “You cannot live like second-class citizens”, he told me, “After all, we are here to represent the state”.

The military and gendarmes have a number of different roles in mining zones. As early as the 1990s, officers could be employed as military advisers by mining concessions such as the SAG; they received a salary and kept their title and salary in the Guinean Army as well. More recently, since 2010, other soldiers (as well as gendarmes) have been requisitioned by companies for periods of three to six months to guard their lands and property and receive a bonus in addition to their salary. These missions are particularly sought after by soldiers, who
are often posted in precarious situations, particularly in outlying areas (Dessertine, 2019c). Since 2015, eviction missions have been organised more regularly, at the request of companies, but also in some cases, at the request of the government. These mainly involve expelling gold miners by burning or destroying their temporary camps and requisitioning mechanised equipment. They also target small foreign entrepreneurs, as I mentioned before, who undertake (semi-)industrial exploitation without government authorisation or with only a prospecting permit. Finally, gendarmeries and military bases (points d’appui in French) are sometimes distributed in an ad hoc manner in mining areas, notably because they are often located near borders (in this instance, with Mali) or because their presence implies conflictual cohabitations.

The strengthening of the military presence in this region is closely linked to the development of industrial exploitation and the increasing competition around access to resources. The problem, as the geologist I interviewed pointed out, arises during the exploitation phase – compensation is paid and people are kicked out, usually in a violent manner. While the prospecting phase is often much less regulated (D’Avignon, 2018), the exploitation phase is based on clearly defined areas, and the presence of soldiers and police tends to formalise internal borders, following a process of “internal territorialisation” (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). Indeed, providing the services of the army to mining companies effectively privatises them. This gives mining operators full territorial sovereignty over the assets and areas covered by their permits and, according to a logic of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003), sometimes there are overflows, leading to excesses, as in the episode mentioned in the introduction. The recurrence of this violence illustrates how private ownership in these areas is far from obvious and sometimes involves the use of violence, even though companies have an obligation to respect corporate social responsibility (CSR) and some even adhere to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights; for example, AngloGold Ashanti, which owns the SAG, mentioned previously.

These expulsion processes, a consequence of creating borders through the granting of permits, which give rise to the formation of inclusion and exclusion zones, are perceived by company agents as being particularly effective in Guinea. The Guinean Army still holds primary power in Guinea because of its political history, which was marked by the repressive regime of Sékou Touré (1958–1984) and then by the military regimes of Lansana Conté (1984–2008) and Moussa Dadis Camara (2008–2009). To my question, “What if the miners do not leave?”, a geologist replied, “The difference between Guinea and Senegal, for example, [I had told him earlier about a conflictual situation in Senegal] maybe that Guinea
could be called a military state, whereas Senegal could not. For example, mining company officials can spend years negotiating with locals. But in Guinea, the state just says, ‘Hey, get out of here, fast!’ Here, in fact, the army is in charge. If you agree with the army, you stay; if you disagree, we kick you out and replace you with someone else”. While it is difficult to verify the accuracy of this statement, this situation shows how an analysis of the relationships between the state/public and mining companies/private operators must be placed in the appropriate historicity for each context: the place of the army in Guinean society allows for particularly violent evictions, generally accepted in the population. Indeed, the perception of expulsion processes among locals is quite ambivalent. While some people denounce the violence that has occurred and mount resistance operations, especially women, whose blockades are featured regularly in the national media, for many, “at least it shows that the state has a presence here”, as one group of gold diggers said.

There are at least two possible explanations for this attitude. First, the way in which artisanal camps are perceived: while some see them as autonomous spaces, offering modernisation, with markets that sell mobile phones and motorcycles (Dessertine, 2016), others see them as dirty, lawless places where drugs, guns, and alcohol abound, and where men go to find prostitutes. Their destruction is therefore not considered completely negative. Second, these remarks also testify to a specific relationship between the state and the people, along the lines of the “desire for state” (Hibou, 2011) in a region where the state is generally thought to be absent. Despite their potential violence, military operations are perceived as more legitimate than the violence perpetrated by the tombolomanw, who are suspected of arbitrary management of gold revenues and appropriation of it for personal purposes.

A military presence, on the contrary, embodies the desire of the state to play a role in gold mining and control gold revenues. In a country where the state has, since independence, followed a paternalistic logic, its presence, even in the form of violent militarisation of areas, has given most of the inhabitants I interviewed some hope for national inclusion. The aim here is not to evaluate whether this inclusion will be effective or if this hope is legitimate, but to show how, from the viewpoint of “desire for a state”, violent exclusion practices can be perceived as acceptable (Hibou, 2011).

Until now, we have considered extractive territorialisation as a sort of “predation” (Leclerc-Olive, 2017) of industrial exploitation, motivated by profit and a favourable national

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13 On the more general role of women in political disputes in Guinea, see Dessertine (2019b).
14 The link between access to modernity and mining areas is a recurrent theme in literature and Ferguson (1999) has studied it in particular depth.
policy, in the context of a weak state that has only its military – and therefore official violence – to rely on as a concrete instrument. Indeed, at first glance, we see a territory in which the technicians are mining agents and the company is sovereign and controls mobility, subcontracting a part of the Guinean Army. But this territorialisation can also be seen as part of a more general movement in the formalisation of space and state rationalisation (Scott, 1998). There is, indeed, a more general trend toward land privatisation and the formalisation of tenure, supported by both public and private stakeholders.

I now show how, through territorial organisation, this public–private relationship is the basis for the emergence of state rationality, with the state reinforcing its sovereignty through delegation.

3.3 “Hybrid territorialisation” or building state territorial control

In 2014–2015 in Kintinian, conflicts broke out several times among inhabitants, gold diggers, and the SAG; this resulted, among other things, in systematised eviction missions in large temporary mining camps in the prefectures of Siguiiri, Mandiana, and Kouroussa, which were the most important sites for ASGM exploitation. These missions, as we have seen, are still taking place today; miners do not have to rebuild their camps. In Kintinian, this conflict turned particularly violent because the government decided to send in the Bérets Rouges (red bérets), an elite corps of the army, infamous for their involvement in the massacres of 28 September 2009 in Conakry.15 However, soldiers and other security agents such as gendarmes or police were also present to assist the company in relocating the inhabitants of the zone “Area One”, whose cession by the state had given rise to the clashes.

As compensation, the company built a resettlement area, Kintinian kuda or new Kintinian, for the residents. In the mission reports to the minister of defence that the commanding officer prepared, there are photocopies of questionnaires drawn up by the SAG to identify households present in the area in order to organise their relocation to another neighbourhood – one that the company had built. Here, the mining company supports not only the territorial organisation of the space but also the census-taking and identification of

15 On 28 September 2009, thousands of demonstrators gathered in a stadium in Conakry to protest the presidential candidacy of Moussa Dadis Camara, then head of the junta. The army severely repressed this meeting. According to the United Nations (UN), at least 156 people were killed and 109 women raped. Some were kept as prisoners in military camps, where they were held in sexual slavery for several days. In a report published in December 2009, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry denounced this incident as a “crime against humanity”.
inhabitants – a typical element of compensation policies – with the census then being handed over to government authorities. Thus, it is no longer simply a mining company, but rather has, de facto, all the attributes of a territorial state. Further, it places these attributes at the service of the Guinean state: it collects census data on population; it establishes territories; and it is supported by an army that it can mobilise for its security.

In this context, mining companies could also be considered a major instrument for consolidating state territorial control since they introduce “territorial modernity”, defined by geometry, at the service of a “bureaucratic state rationality” (Magrin, 2013, p. 211). If the way the state deals with mining regimes can be analysed as a strategy of “selective absence” (Szablowski, 2007b, p. 45), it can thus also be seen as a way to finance the future efficiency of its territorial control by relying on international mining investments and the technical nature of the agents of private operators. Territorialisation lies at the very heart of this relational modality of statecraft that captures mining income by taking a hybrid form – an “institutional bricolage” (Geenen, 2016) where concessions may be regarded as “transitioning” settings. Here, concessions such as mining exploitation permits appear to be transitioning settings for state territorialisation.

Territorialisation has, indeed, become a common way of managing space as, for instance, in land disputes between villages, in which inhabitants are increasingly citing national law and titles, even in the region’s non-mining areas. Cashew nut plantations are increasingly at the heart of these conflicts, as the planting of trees makes it possible to legally appropriate an area and obtain title to it. Although it is difficult to assert a cause-and-effect link between industrial extractive territorialisation and the use of national law by local populations in land disputes, it should be noted that industrial mining and plantation agriculture testify to the same process: the introduction of a way of managing space based on a territorial model referring to the national law. This method can also be reappropriated by customary stakeholders in some areas. In the border town of Kourémalé, for example, the *sotikemno* obliges newcomers to fill in a residence certificate. These new bureaucratic practices testify to a paradigm shift in the analysis of gold-bearing mineral zones, from a first-comers/late-comers polarity towards an inclusion/exclusion polarity. This polarity is expressed both in spatial and socio-political terms and is applied at different levels: that of the permits’ boundaries and, more generally, of the boundaries established in this broader territorialisation process. It also contributes to building populations’ perceptions of inclusion in or exclusion from the state.
4 Conclusion

In this article, I aimed to analyse the political-spatial reconfigurations caused by gold mining activities in Guinea, with regards the tighter control over gold diggers’ mobility, the increasing presence of industrial mining, and the territorialisation process. With regards ASGM, I showed how its mechanisation blurs the line between small-scale and semi-industrial exploitation, but that it relies, unlike mining permits, on hyper-mobility, not spatial fixation. The multiplication of exploration and exploitation using (semi-)industrial mining permits implies stricter control of gold diggers’ mobility – particularly visible through military expulsion operations – and the need for gold diggers to establish themselves more permanently. This situation has led to the polarisation of ASGM mobility between hyper-mobility and long-lasting settlements, allowing less potential for the emergence of temporary spaces, such as mining camps.

I focused particularly on industrial mining and the expansion of land securitisation through gold mining permits, especially exploration permits. My analysis of this tangible territorialisation highlights delimitation practices in the making and shows how the prospecting phase leads to the creation of exclusionary governance spaces. Indeed, the imposition of a territorial grid is associated with a specific perception of boundaries and mobility, articulated within the paradigm of exclusion. Moreover, by implying, from the outset, asymmetrical relationships between the gold diggers, the local community, and mining company agents, the prospecting phase also prepares the ground for potential forms of expulsion and clearly associates political violence with territorialisation.

During the exploitation phase, the Guinean Army, which is theoretically supposed to protect and defend the external national border, is mobilised to create internal borders. It no longer is a question of gold diggers adapting their spatial fluidity by trying to find workaround arrangements, but rather of them fitting in with the partitioning model being driven by industrial extraction and spread by extractive territorialisation. Extractive territorialisation has been analysed as part of a larger, hybrid territorialisation process: first, it formalises spaces linked to and surrounding the exploitation area; second, it seems to correlate to a more general tendency of appropriation under the territorial model by local communities. Territorialisation, understood as both a political and a spatial process, thus serves as a starting point for my analysis of space formalisation in a peripheral region where the state has long be seen among locals as predominantly absent.
5 References


