A solution to the two-person implementation problem
Jean-François Laslier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 10499
- IdHAL : jean-francois-laslier
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8334-1350
- IdRef : 069975124
Résumé
We propose strike mechanisms as a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978) and Maskin (1999) according to which, in two-person societies, no Pareto efficient rule is Nash-implementable. A strike mechanism specifies the number of alternatives that each player vetoes. Each player simultaneously casts these vetoes and the mechanism selects randomly one alternative among the non-vetoed ones. For strict preferences over alternatives and under a very weak condition for extending preferences over lotteries, these mechanisms are deterministic-in-equilibrium. They Nash implement a class of Pareto efficient social choice rules called Pareto-and-veto rules. Moreover, under mild richness conditions on the domain of preferences over lotteries, any Pareto efficient Nash-implementable rule is a Pareto-and-veto rule and hence is implementable through a strike mechanism.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
A solution to the two-person implementation problem
|
Résumé |
en
We propose strike mechanisms as a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978) and Maskin (1999) according to which, in two-person societies, no Pareto efficient rule is Nash-implementable. A strike mechanism specifies the number of alternatives that each player vetoes. Each player simultaneously casts these vetoes and the mechanism selects randomly one alternative among the non-vetoed ones. For strict preferences over alternatives and under a very weak condition for extending preferences over lotteries, these mechanisms are deterministic-in-equilibrium. They Nash implement a class of Pareto efficient social choice rules called Pareto-and-veto rules. Moreover, under mild richness conditions on the domain of preferences over lotteries, any Pareto efficient Nash-implementable rule is a Pareto-and-veto rule and hence is implementable through a strike mechanism.
|
Auteur(s) |
Jean-François Laslier
1, 2
, Matías Núñez
3, 4
, M. Remzi Sanver
5
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
CREST -
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
( 2579 )
- 5, Avenue Henry Le Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau
- France
4
GENES -
Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique
( 302088 )
- 5, avenue Henry Le Chatelier
91120 Palaiseau
- France
5
LAMSADE -
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision
( 989 )
- Place de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16
- France
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Numéro d'article |
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2021-06
|
Volume |
194
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Nash implementation, Two players, Pareto efficiency
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105261 |
UT key WOS | 000652015500002 |
Loading...