Education Transmission and Network Formation
Vincent Boucher
(1)
,
Carlo del Bello
(2)
,
Fabrizio Panebianco
(3)
,
Thierry Verdier
(4, 5, 6, 7)
,
Yves Zenou
(8, 7, 9)
1
ULaval -
Université Laval [Québec]
2 Italian Tax Agency
3 Catholic University of Milan
4 PSE - Paris School of Economics
5 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 PUC-Rio - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro [Brasil] = Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro [Brazil] = Université catholique pontificale de Rio de Janeiro [Brésil]
7 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
8 Monash university
9 IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
2 Italian Tax Agency
3 Catholic University of Milan
4 PSE - Paris School of Economics
5 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 PUC-Rio - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro [Brasil] = Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro [Brazil] = Université catholique pontificale de Rio de Janeiro [Brésil]
7 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
8 Monash university
9 IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
Résumé
We propose a model of intergenerational transmission of education wherein children belong to either highly educated or low-educated families. Children choose the intensity of their social activities, while parents decide how much educational effort to exert. Using Add Health data, we find that, on average, children’s homophily acts as a complement to the educational effort of highly educated parents but as a substitute for the educational effort of low-educated parents. We also find that policies that subsidize kids’ socialization efforts can backfire for low-educated students because they tend to increase their interactions with other low-educated students.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Education Transmission and Network Formation
|
Résumé |
en
We propose a model of intergenerational transmission of education wherein children belong to either highly educated or low-educated families. Children choose the intensity of their social activities, while parents decide how much educational effort to exert. Using Add Health data, we find that, on average, children’s homophily acts as a complement to the educational effort of highly educated parents but as a substitute for the educational effort of low-educated parents. We also find that policies that subsidize kids’ socialization efforts can backfire for low-educated students because they tend to increase their interactions with other low-educated students.
|
Auteur(s) |
Vincent Boucher
1
, Carlo del Bello
2
, Fabrizio Panebianco
3
, Thierry Verdier
4, 5, 6, 7
, Yves Zenou
8, 7, 9
1
ULaval -
Université Laval [Québec]
( 93488 )
- 2325, rue de l'Université Québec G1V 0A6
- Canada
2
Italian Tax Agency
( 1150700 )
- Italie
3
Catholic University of Milan
( 336223 )
-
- France
4
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
PUC-Rio -
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro [Brasil] = Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro [Brazil] = Université catholique pontificale de Rio de Janeiro [Brésil]
( 362752 )
- R. Marquês de São Vicente, 225 - Gávea, Rio de Janeiro - RJ, 22451-900, Brésil
- Brésil
7
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
8
Monash university
( 1081708 )
- Australie
9
IZA -
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
( 237214 )
- Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-9 D-53113 Bonn Germany
- Allemagne
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2023-01
|
Volume |
41
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
129-173
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1086/718981 |
UT key WOS | 000899611800002 |
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