Private, social and self-insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help. A political economy analysis
Pierre Pestieau
(1, 2, 3)
,
Philippe de Donder
(4)
Philippe de Donder
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 742006
- IdHAL : philippe-de-donder
- IdRef : 199756120
Résumé
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters can top up with private insurance, saving and family help. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help, and amount of family help received. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-dependency probability ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority-chosen level. A majority of voters would oppose banning private insurance.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Private, social and self-insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help. A political economy analysis
|
Résumé |
en
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters can top up with private insurance, saving and family help. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help, and amount of family help received. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-dependency probability ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority-chosen level. A majority of voters would oppose banning private insurance.
|
Auteur(s) |
Pierre Pestieau
1, 2, 3
, Philippe de Donder
4
1
UCL -
Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain
( 92863 )
- Place de l'Université 1 - 1348 Louvain-La-Neuve
- Belgique
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 1002422 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2017
|
Volume |
19
|
Page/Identifiant |
18-37
|
Numéro |
1
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1111/jpet.12163 |
UT key WOS | 000393457500002 |
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