Choosing an electoral rule: Values and self-interest in the lab
Damien Bol
(1)
,
André Blais
(2)
,
Maxime Coulombe
(2)
,
Jean-François Laslier
(3, 4)
,
Jean-Benoit Pilet
(5)
Jean-François Laslier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 10499
- IdHAL : jean-francois-laslier
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8334-1350
- IdRef : 069975124
Résumé
We study the choice of multi-person bargaining protocols in the context of politics. In politics, citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic rules, for instance via referendums. If they support the rule that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment, in which 252 subjects participated. In the first stage, these subjects experience elections under plurality and approval voting. In the second stage, they decide which rule they want to use for extra elections. We find that egalitarian values that subjects hold outside of the lab shape their choice of electoral rule in the second stage when a rule led to a fairer distribution of payoffs compared to the other one in the first stage. The implication is that people have consistent ‘value-driven preferences’ for decision rules.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Choosing an electoral rule: Values and self-interest in the lab
|
Résumé |
en
We study the choice of multi-person bargaining protocols in the context of politics. In politics, citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic rules, for instance via referendums. If they support the rule that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment, in which 252 subjects participated. In the first stage, these subjects experience elections under plurality and approval voting. In the second stage, they decide which rule they want to use for extra elections. We find that egalitarian values that subjects hold outside of the lab shape their choice of electoral rule in the second stage when a rule led to a fairer distribution of payoffs compared to the other one in the first stage. The implication is that people have consistent ‘value-driven preferences’ for decision rules.
|
Auteur(s) |
Damien Bol
1
, André Blais
2
, Maxime Coulombe
2
, Jean-François Laslier
3, 4
, Jean-Benoit Pilet
5
1
King‘s College London
( 327716 )
- Strand Campus, London WC2R 2LS
- Royaume-Uni
2
UdeM -
Université de Montréal
( 302452 )
- 2900 Boulevard Edouard-Montpetit, Montréal, QC H3T 1J4
- Canada
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
ULB -
Université libre de Bruxelles
( 303388 )
- Avenue Franklin Roosevelt 50 - 1050 Bruxelles
- Belgique
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Date de publication |
2023-03
|
Volume |
95
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Licence |
Paternité
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Page/Identifiant |
102602
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Political economy, Lab experiment, Choice of decision rules, Electoral rules, Voting
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102602 |
UT key WOS | 000967986300001 |
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