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Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2023

Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games

Abstract

In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in more general settings and may help to predict the stable splitting of a whole group into disjoint coalitions
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Dates and versions

halshs-04335830 , version 1 (11-12-2023)
halshs-04335830 , version 2 (19-02-2024)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : halshs-04335830 , version 2

Cite

Gabrielle Demange. Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games. 2024. ⟨halshs-04335830v2⟩
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