Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2025

Competition Law Enforcement in Dynamic Markets: Proposing a Flexible Trade-off between Fines and Behavioural Injunctions

Résumé

In abuses of dominance cases, competition authorities typically impose both pecuniary sanctions and behavioural injunctions. These instruments serve distinct but complementary functions: fines primarily deter anti-competitive behaviour; injunctions seek to restore conditions conducive to competition on the merits. Yet, the effectiveness of such behavioural remedies remains contested. They often entail long-term obligations and are vulnerable to strategic circumvention or to uncertainties inherent in competitive and technological dynamics. In this paper, focusing on the European Union (EU)'s context, we propose a two-tiered sanctioning framework that addresses the drawbacks of behavioural injuctions: an initial fine, payable immediately, and a conditional component whose imposition - both in terms of activation and magnitude - would depend on the observed implementation and effects of the behavioural obligations. This structure aims to enhance both the flexibility and credibility of remedies, while preserving deterrence.abu

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Dates et versions

halshs-05188484 , version 1 (26-07-2025)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-05188484 , version 1

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Patrice Bougette, Frédéric Marty, Simone Vannuccini. Competition Law Enforcement in Dynamic Markets: Proposing a Flexible Trade-off between Fines and Behavioural Injunctions. 2025. ⟨halshs-05188484⟩
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