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Article dans une revue Mathematics of Operations Research Année : 2007

Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Résumé

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.
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Dates et versions

hal-00487954, version 1 (31-05-2010)

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Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala. Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007, Vol.32,n°2, pp.413-424. ⟨10.1287/moor.1060.0248⟩. ⟨hal-00487954⟩
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