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Rapport Année : 2002

Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems

Résumé

Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in a class of such games, namely infinitely repeated decision problems with discounting. The condition is two-fold: the range of possible utility levels in the decision problem should be bounded from below, and the discount factor between successive periods should be non-decreasing over time, a condition met by exponential, quasi-exponential and hyperbolic discounting.
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Dates et versions

hal-00593648, version 1 (16-05-2011)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00593648 , version 1

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Nicolas Vieille, Jörgen Weibull. Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems. 2002. ⟨hal-00593648⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 20/04/2024
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