Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Selling and Saving Energy: Energy Efficiency Obligations in Liberalized Energy Markets
|
Résumé |
en
In Europe, energy efficiency obligations are imposed on energy retailers competing in liberalized energy markets. They comply by subsidizing energy efficiency investments made by energy end-users within or outside their customer base. We develop a model describing how competition in the energy market affects compliance strategies. We find that, instead of selecting the most cost-effective investments options, firms may either target their most elastic customers, which enables them to increase their retail price, or their competitor’s customers, which protects their sales. Allowing firms to trade obligations can restore cost-effectiveness, but reduces consumer surplus. Overall, the degree of flexibility that should be incorporated into such programs crucially depends on the degree of heterogeneity across investment costs and the relative weights governments assign to cost-effectiveness and consumer surplus.
|
Auteur(s)
|
Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet
1
, Matthieu Glachant
2
, Jean-Philippe Nicolaï
3, 4
1
CIRED -
Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement
( 1042364 )
- 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle - 94736 Nogent-sur-Marne Cedex
- France
-
Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement UMR56 ( 11574 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
AgroParisTech ( 148117 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Université Paris-Saclay ( 419361 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR8568 ( 441569 )
2
CERNA i3 -
Centre d'économie industrielle i3
( 73831 )
- 60, boulevard Saint Michel, 75272 Paris Cedex 06
- France
-
Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) ( 301492 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation ( 1159016 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR9217 ( 441569 )
3
EconomiX -
EconomiX
( 2564 )
- Bâtiment G
200 Avenue de la République
92001 NANTERRE CEDEX
- France
-
Université Paris Nanterre UMR7235 ( 116205 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7235 ( 441569 )
4
ETH Zürich -
Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich]
( 180925 )
- Hauptgebäude, Rämistrasse 101, 8092 Zürich
- Suisse
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2020-09-01
|
Volume |
41
|
Numéro |
01
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
-
L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
-
L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior/L.L2.L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
-
L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L94 - Electric Utilities
-
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q4 - Energy/Q.Q4.Q41 - Demand and Supply • Prices
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Économie et finance quantitative [q-fin]
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés |
en
Energy efficiency, Imperfect competition, Information asymmetry, Internal and external compliance.
|
DOI |
10.5547/01956574.41.SI1.lgir |