Competition and the Efficiency of Markets for Technology
Marie-Laure Allain
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1000875
Emeric Henry
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1114203
- IdHAL : emeric-henry
- ORCID : 0000-0001-9851-084X
- IdRef : 224319914
Résumé
The sale of ideas through licensing facilitates the division of labor between the separate activities of research and development. This vertical specialization can improve the overall efficiency of the innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing of the sale: the buyer of an innovative project should assume development at the stage at which he has an efficiency advantage. Using data from the pharmaceutical industry, we show that competition between potential buyers is related to the timing of licensing. Furthermore, the effect differs by the type of competitor. We then describe a class of models that yields predictions consistent with these empirical patterns. Our key insight is that increased competition may increase licensing delays and hence inefficiency.
Format du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Competition and the Efficiency of Markets for Technology
|
Résumé |
en
The sale of ideas through licensing facilitates the division of labor between the separate activities of research and development. This vertical specialization can improve the overall efficiency of the innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing of the sale: the buyer of an innovative project should assume development at the stage at which he has an efficiency advantage. Using data from the pharmaceutical industry, we show that competition between potential buyers is related to the timing of licensing. Furthermore, the effect differs by the type of competitor. We then describe a class of models that yields predictions consistent with these empirical patterns. Our key insight is that increased competition may increase licensing delays and hence inefficiency.
|
Auteur(s) |
Marie-Laure Allain
1, 2
, Emeric Henry
3
, Margaret Kyle
4
1
CREST -
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
( 2579 )
- 5, Avenue Henry Le Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau
- France
2
X-DEP-ECO -
Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique
( 444480 )
- École Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex
- France
3
ECON -
Département d'économie (Sciences Po)
( 226874 )
- 28 rue des Saints-Pères - 75007 Paris
- France
4
CERNA i3 -
Centre d'économie industrielle i3
( 73831 )
- 60, boulevard Saint Michel, 75272 Paris Cedex 06
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2016-04
|
Volume |
62
|
Numéro |
4
|
Page/Identifiant |
1000-1019
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Competition, Technology
|
DOI | 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2191 |
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