Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in
the Presence of Global Environmental
Problems
Résumé
This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. we call this behaviour precautionary commitment.
Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue. we also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinated global co-operation can result from a strategic action
from the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.
Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue. we also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinated global co-operation can result from a strategic action
from the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.
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