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Article Dans Une Revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2006

The Core as the Set of Eventually Stable Outcomes

Résumé

As a justification of the core as a set of stable social states, Sengupta and Sengupta [1996. A property of the core. Games Econ. Behav. 12, 266–273] show that for any transferable utility (TU) cooperative game with non-empty core, for every imputation outside the core there is an element in the core that indirectly dominates the imputation in a desirable way. In this note we show that this appealing property of the core no longer holds even for the class of hyperplane games, an immediate generalization of TU games into the environments without side payments.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00078448 , version 1 (06-06-2006)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00078448 , version 1

Citer

Abderrahmane Ziad, Anindya Bhattacharya. The Core as the Set of Eventually Stable Outcomes. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 54 (1), pp.25-30. ⟨halshs-00078448⟩
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