Sellers dilemna due to social interactions between customers
Jean-Pierre Nadal
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 11356
- IdHAL : jean-pierre-nadal
- ORCID : 0000-0003-0022-0647
- IdRef : 032824300
Denis Phan
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1117320
- IdHAL : denis-phan
- ORCID : 0009-0005-2118-9839
Résumé
In this paper, we consider a discrete choice model where heterogeneous agents are subject to mutual influences. We explore some consequences on the market's behaviour, in the simplest case of a uniform willingness to pay distribution. We exhibit a first-order phase transition in the profit optimization by the monopolist: if the social influence is strong enough, there is a regime where, if the mean willingness to pay increases, or if the production costs decrease, the optimal solution for the monopolist jumps from a solution with a high price and a small number of buyers, to a solution with a low price and a large number of buyers. Depending on the path of prices adjustments by the monopolist, simulations show hysteretic effects on the fraction of buyers.
Domaines
Gestion et managementFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Sellers dilemna due to social interactions between customers
|
Résumé |
en
In this paper, we consider a discrete choice model where heterogeneous agents are subject to mutual influences. We explore some consequences on the market's behaviour, in the simplest case of a uniform willingness to pay distribution. We exhibit a first-order phase transition in the profit optimization by the monopolist: if the social influence is strong enough, there is a regime where, if the mean willingness to pay increases, or if the production costs decrease, the optimal solution for the monopolist jumps from a solution with a high price and a small number of buyers, to a solution with a low price and a large number of buyers. Depending on the path of prices adjustments by the monopolist, simulations show hysteretic effects on the fraction of buyers.
|
Auteur(s) |
Mirta Gordon
1
, Jean-Pierre Nadal
2
, Denis Phan
3
, Jean Vannimenus
2
1
Leibniz - IMAG -
Laboratoire Leibniz
( 190 )
- 46, avenue Félix Viallet - 38031 GRENOBLE Cedex
- France
2
LPS -
Laboratoire de Physique Statistique de l'ENS
( 4 )
- 24 rue Lhomond 75231 PARIS Cedex 05
- France
3
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Titre de l'ouvrage |
Physica A
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2005
|
Volume |
356
|
Numéro |
2-4
|
Page/Identifiant |
628-640
|
Titre du congrès |
Physica A
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Ising model, Social interactions, Monopoly market, Econophysics
|
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