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Article dans une revue Econometrica Année : 2006

The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring

Résumé

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.
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halshs-00119553, version 1 (11-12-2006)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00119553 , version 1

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Johannes Hörner, Wojciech Olszewski. The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring. Econometrica, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1499-1544. ⟨halshs-00119553⟩

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