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Article dans une revue Economic Theory Année : 2008

Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems

Résumé

It has been known for a long time that many binary voting rules can select a Pareto dominated outcome, that is an outcome such that there exists some other alternative which is preferred by every voter. In this paper, we show that some of these rules can select an outcome Pareto dominated in a much stronger sense. Furthermore, our main results are concerned with the evaluation of the likelihood of Pareto dominated outcomes under four social choice rules commonly used in Parliaments or in committees. Given a set of four alternatives and a set of n individuals, we assume anonymous profiles and using analytical methods we compute the proportion of profiles at which the Pareto criterion is violated. Our results show that one should not be especially worried about the existence of the possibility as such.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00152382, version 1 (06-06-2007)

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Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou, Jérémy Picot. Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems. Economic Theory, 2008, 34 (2), pp.331-358. ⟨10.1007/s00199-006-0184-5⟩. ⟨halshs-00152382⟩
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