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Article dans une revue Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics Année : 2006

The attribution process of delegation contracts in the french urban public transport sector : why competitive tendering is a myth

Résumé

This paper analyses the French recent experience of franchising in the urban public transport sector in the light of Transaction Cost Economics arguments. It provides theoretical arguments supported by empirical evidence explaining why the compulsory use of competitive tendering in this sector did not translate into better performance, the main reasons being the lack of transparency of the attribution process and the limited monitoring capabilities of local authorities.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00273378, version 1 (15-04-2008)

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Anne Yvrande-Billon. The attribution process of delegation contracts in the french urban public transport sector : why competitive tendering is a myth. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2006, 77 (4), pp.453-478. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00315.x⟩. ⟨halshs-00273378⟩
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