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Article Dans Une Revue Health Economics Année : 2011

External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation

Résumé

External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm while a home country (H) can either negotiate independently or implement ER based on the foreign price. We show that country H always prefers ER if (i) it can condition ER on the drug being subsidized in the foreign country and (ii) copayments are higher in H than in F. H's preference is
reinforced when the difference between country copayments is large and/or H's population is small. External referencing by H always harms F if (ii) holds, but less so if (i) holds.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00303682 , version 1 (22-07-2008)

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Begoña Garcia Mariñoso, Izabela Jelovac, Pau Olivella. External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation. Health Economics, 2011, 20 (6), pp. 737-756. ⟨10.1002/hec.1630⟩. ⟨halshs-00303682⟩
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