MIGRATORY POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: HOW TO BRING BEST PEOPLE BACK?
Résumé
This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model with
exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good
workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers.
Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the
perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the
incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow.
exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good
workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers.
Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the
perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the
incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow.
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