Are Corporate Governance Systems Typologies Relevant? Evidence from European Transfers of Ownership Rights
Résumé
Corporate governance systems vary considerably across Europe, reflecting the differences in the
financial and legal systems, and in corporate ownership structures. The purpose of this paper is to
identify the relevant governance system typologies. To test the robustness of the typologies, we study
transfers of ownership rights that may be an important determinant of corporate governance in the
largest European economies. Results overall invalidate the expectations induced from the theoretical
analysis of national corporate governance systems. They suggest that the classical typologies are
insufficient to distinguish between governance systems as they miss to capture institutional
complementarities and political differences. Our unexpected results could also suggest a convergence of
the systems, not towards the Anglo-American model, but towards a new model.
financial and legal systems, and in corporate ownership structures. The purpose of this paper is to
identify the relevant governance system typologies. To test the robustness of the typologies, we study
transfers of ownership rights that may be an important determinant of corporate governance in the
largest European economies. Results overall invalidate the expectations induced from the theoretical
analysis of national corporate governance systems. They suggest that the classical typologies are
insufficient to distinguish between governance systems as they miss to capture institutional
complementarities and political differences. Our unexpected results could also suggest a convergence of
the systems, not towards the Anglo-American model, but towards a new model.