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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2009

Should executive compensation rules govern Audit fees ? An anlysis of executive compensation driven frauds.

Résumé

Executive compensation incentives are designed to align the interrests of both managers and shareholders. Managers may however manipulate the underlying state variable under his/her responsabiity. A higher audit effort is therefore necessary to detect potential manipulation.
This paper develops an analytical model examining relations between the executive compensation scheme, the fraud mechanism and the audit effort...
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Dates et versions

halshs-00419726 , version 1 (24-09-2009)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00419726 , version 1

Citer

Cédric Lesage, Franck Moraux. Should executive compensation rules govern Audit fees ? An anlysis of executive compensation driven frauds.. 2009 International Decision Sciences Institute Conference, Jun 2009, Nancy, France. 22 p. ⟨halshs-00419726⟩
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