Banks risk race: A signaling explanation - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2011

Banks risk race: A signaling explanation

Résumé

Many observers argue that the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks has been one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 …nancial turmoil. But what could have pushed banks to engage in such a risk race? The answer brought by this paper builds on the classical signaling model by Spence. If banks' returns can be observed while risk cannot, less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
BANKCOMP_FINAL_2011.pdf ( 225.11 Ko ) Télécharger
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-00424214, version 1 (14-10-2009)
halshs-00424214, version 2 (27-04-2011)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00424214 , version 2

Citer

Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu. Banks risk race: A signaling explanation. 2011. ⟨halshs-00424214v2⟩
140 Consultations
717 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus