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Autre publication scientifique Année : 2009

Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision

Résumé

In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to determine these equilibria.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00464387, version 1 (17-03-2010)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00464387 , version 1

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Ahmet Ozkardas, Agnieszka Rusinowska. Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision. 2009. ⟨halshs-00464387⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
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