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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Mathematical Economics Année : 2002

Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

Résumé

We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations.

Dates et versions

halshs-00498879 , version 1 (08-07-2010)

Licence

Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification

Identifiants

Citer

Gaël Giraud, Céline Rouchon. Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002, 38 (4), pp.441-463. ⟨10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00077-0⟩. ⟨halshs-00498879⟩
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